Uyghur News
17-07-08, 08:39
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Scattered comments on CECC roundtable, 7/16
Yesterday afternoon, the Congressional Executive Commission on China held an interesting roundtable discussion on China's "information lockdown" in the run-up to the Olympics. The non-commission participants were Phelim Kine of Human Rights Watch, Ben Carduss of the International Campaign for Tibet, and Alim Seytoff of the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Not surprisingly, there was a general consensus that the Chinese government has failed to provide an environment that fosters the free flow of information and that it has not lived up to its obligations as set forth in both Olympic bid documents and the body of Chinese law.
There were a few particularly interesting elements of the discussion that I would like to comment on here. The first is a suggestion that Phelim Kine raised in his opening statement, a suggestion that has not, as far as I can recall, been widely considered up to this point. He proposed that the International Olympic Committee establish a standing human rights group which would need to monitor and approve the human rights conditions of any future bidders. It is surprising that this has not been considered in the past. Following the political turmoil that China's internal human rights situation has created vis-a-vis the Olympics, it has become necessary to include the acceptance of international human rights standards as a precondition for hosting the Olympic games in the future.
Alim Seytoff made some powerful statements regarding conditions for Uyghurs in China. He described the current situation as "the darkest time in the history of the Uyghur people," and, referring to recent incidents in which Chinese security have killed Uyghur "terrorists," outlined a sharp intensification of anti-separatist and anti-terror campaigns aimed at Uyghurs. Echoing this sentiment, Ben Carduss described conditions in China's western minority regions as similar to those of the Cultural Revolution, with heavy Party propaganda slogans painted and displayed on banners throughout towns and cities. Seytoff also mentioned the possibility that young Uyghurs may turn to extremism in the face of continued injustice. He described this scenario as a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the Chinese government, in what it claims to be a struggle against religious extremism, creates terrorists or separatists where there were none to begin with.
During the question and answer period, panelists discussed the need for inter-agency cooperation in US efforts to affect human rights in China. The noted China scholar Michael Pillsbury briefly described the nature of the interaction between US and Chinese military leaders, adding that it has become "taboo" to raise human rights concerns during meetings and discussions. There is a fear among many in the US military leadership, he said, of "offending" Chinese partners, despite the fact that it is, ultimately, the Chinese military leadership that heads much of the country's internal security apparatus. He added, furthermore, that the US is providing a significant amount of assistance and technology for China's Olympic security operations, and asked whether or not it should be necessary to link human rights with further discussions at the military level.
The question and answer period also focused on the increasingly prevalent topic of nationalism in China. All of the panelists seemed to concur that China's nationlist movements are mainly a top-to-bottom phenomenon, with the government playing it "like an instrument," according to Ben Carduss. Phelim Kine argued that it was mainly a result of young Chinese nationalists hearing only one narrative, and Alim Seytoff used the word "brainwashing."
While Carduss did mention his fear that the Party may, some day, lose control over popular nationalism, none of the panelists really gave enough weight to the movement's bottom-up characteristics. Their analyses ignored the violent reactions of overseas Chinese and English speaking Chinese in China who do, in fact, get more than one narrative. Much of the nationalist anger following the riots in Tibet was a direct reaction to western media coverage, and was not orchestrated by the government. Furthermore, these movements were not necessarily in support of the Chinese state, but of the the Chinese nationality, an important distinction that Peter Gries emphasizes. Nationalists do hear the west's side of the story, but they reject it.
Specific recent examples come to mind. In January, the French car company Renault ran an ad which used a manipulated image of a famous portait of Mao. Overseas Chinese, with no orchestration by the Party, led a campaign against the company and demanded -- and got -- a public apology and a withdrawal of the ad from periodicals. In addition, a nationalistic response of overseas, western-educated Chinese students threatened Duke University undergrad Wang Qianyuan as well as her family in China.
In 1999, the government did begin to lose control of nationalists' anti-American protests following the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, and nationalist movements have been largely responsible for the failure of more than one Chinese government predating the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese nationalism works both ways, with the Party working hard to manipulate and control it to their advantage, and with citizens sparking their own movements and placing unwanted pressure on leaders at the top.
The discussion turned speculative when questions were raised regarding the post Olympic period, specifically with regard to heightened security measures and increased controls on information. In a recent piece on The China Beat, Nicolai Volland noted that
the clampdown on dissent and the stricter handling on local forms of resistance...has enhanced the power of the central state, and the CCP will be unlikely to give away easily the increased leverage over local politics. There is little to be gained for the Party-state from easing controls in the area of civil liberties, and the forms of repression we witness currently might, at best, be allowed to fizzle out over a longer period of time. It is likely, however, that the central government will find it desirable to perpetuate at least some of the "emergency" powers gained in the name of a one-time event.
This was the general sentiment of the participants in CECC's roundtable as well. It appears that the Olympics have strengthened the Party's legitimacy, and thereby its mandate to control. There is, therefore, no reason to expect that they will willingly relinquish increased power, especially if the Olympic event is a success. Referring to Tibet, Ben Carduss -- emphasizing that his evidence was purely anecdotal -- noted the possibility that the Party will use the fading international spotlight of the post-Olympic period to deal a final blow to any resistance or dissident movements.
I am slightly more optimistic about the potential for post-Olympic reforms. While some may argue that the human rights condition in China may worsen following the Olympics, I argue that a post-Olympic cultural malaise will produce a general decline in the CCP's ability to proclaim itself the steward of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Communist Party relies heavily on major events such as the Olympics in creating a Chinese success story with the Party as hero. With no such event on the horizon following the Olympics, the notion of "social harmony" will also lose its power. There will be no justification for a "stability at all costs" type of policy. As a result, people will increasingly demand accountability and access to honest information, especially regarding health and environmental issues, property confiscations, and reconstruction of the areas hit hardest by the Sichuan earthquake.
During the roundtable discussion, speculation arose with regard to the next major influencing factor for the development of the rule of law in China. Ben Carduss mentioned increased pressure for China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But he also noted that written law isn't the problem; it's enforcement. While China may face increased pressure to ratify the ICCPR, and will most likely ultimately do so, another set of laws on the books in and of itself will do nothing to produce real reforms in practice.
The reality is that the international community -- at the official level -- has few, if any, remaining tools with which to influence China's domestic human rights situation. Absent a broad movement of international companies willingly linking their investments in China to progress in the human rights field -- governments are unlikely to force them to do so -- the next impact event will be internal. The likelihood of such an event increases as the intensity of the world's focus on China decreases.
http://cngovwatch.blogspot.com/2008/07/cecc-roundtable-716.html
Scattered comments on CECC roundtable, 7/16
Yesterday afternoon, the Congressional Executive Commission on China held an interesting roundtable discussion on China's "information lockdown" in the run-up to the Olympics. The non-commission participants were Phelim Kine of Human Rights Watch, Ben Carduss of the International Campaign for Tibet, and Alim Seytoff of the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Not surprisingly, there was a general consensus that the Chinese government has failed to provide an environment that fosters the free flow of information and that it has not lived up to its obligations as set forth in both Olympic bid documents and the body of Chinese law.
There were a few particularly interesting elements of the discussion that I would like to comment on here. The first is a suggestion that Phelim Kine raised in his opening statement, a suggestion that has not, as far as I can recall, been widely considered up to this point. He proposed that the International Olympic Committee establish a standing human rights group which would need to monitor and approve the human rights conditions of any future bidders. It is surprising that this has not been considered in the past. Following the political turmoil that China's internal human rights situation has created vis-a-vis the Olympics, it has become necessary to include the acceptance of international human rights standards as a precondition for hosting the Olympic games in the future.
Alim Seytoff made some powerful statements regarding conditions for Uyghurs in China. He described the current situation as "the darkest time in the history of the Uyghur people," and, referring to recent incidents in which Chinese security have killed Uyghur "terrorists," outlined a sharp intensification of anti-separatist and anti-terror campaigns aimed at Uyghurs. Echoing this sentiment, Ben Carduss described conditions in China's western minority regions as similar to those of the Cultural Revolution, with heavy Party propaganda slogans painted and displayed on banners throughout towns and cities. Seytoff also mentioned the possibility that young Uyghurs may turn to extremism in the face of continued injustice. He described this scenario as a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the Chinese government, in what it claims to be a struggle against religious extremism, creates terrorists or separatists where there were none to begin with.
During the question and answer period, panelists discussed the need for inter-agency cooperation in US efforts to affect human rights in China. The noted China scholar Michael Pillsbury briefly described the nature of the interaction between US and Chinese military leaders, adding that it has become "taboo" to raise human rights concerns during meetings and discussions. There is a fear among many in the US military leadership, he said, of "offending" Chinese partners, despite the fact that it is, ultimately, the Chinese military leadership that heads much of the country's internal security apparatus. He added, furthermore, that the US is providing a significant amount of assistance and technology for China's Olympic security operations, and asked whether or not it should be necessary to link human rights with further discussions at the military level.
The question and answer period also focused on the increasingly prevalent topic of nationalism in China. All of the panelists seemed to concur that China's nationlist movements are mainly a top-to-bottom phenomenon, with the government playing it "like an instrument," according to Ben Carduss. Phelim Kine argued that it was mainly a result of young Chinese nationalists hearing only one narrative, and Alim Seytoff used the word "brainwashing."
While Carduss did mention his fear that the Party may, some day, lose control over popular nationalism, none of the panelists really gave enough weight to the movement's bottom-up characteristics. Their analyses ignored the violent reactions of overseas Chinese and English speaking Chinese in China who do, in fact, get more than one narrative. Much of the nationalist anger following the riots in Tibet was a direct reaction to western media coverage, and was not orchestrated by the government. Furthermore, these movements were not necessarily in support of the Chinese state, but of the the Chinese nationality, an important distinction that Peter Gries emphasizes. Nationalists do hear the west's side of the story, but they reject it.
Specific recent examples come to mind. In January, the French car company Renault ran an ad which used a manipulated image of a famous portait of Mao. Overseas Chinese, with no orchestration by the Party, led a campaign against the company and demanded -- and got -- a public apology and a withdrawal of the ad from periodicals. In addition, a nationalistic response of overseas, western-educated Chinese students threatened Duke University undergrad Wang Qianyuan as well as her family in China.
In 1999, the government did begin to lose control of nationalists' anti-American protests following the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, and nationalist movements have been largely responsible for the failure of more than one Chinese government predating the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese nationalism works both ways, with the Party working hard to manipulate and control it to their advantage, and with citizens sparking their own movements and placing unwanted pressure on leaders at the top.
The discussion turned speculative when questions were raised regarding the post Olympic period, specifically with regard to heightened security measures and increased controls on information. In a recent piece on The China Beat, Nicolai Volland noted that
the clampdown on dissent and the stricter handling on local forms of resistance...has enhanced the power of the central state, and the CCP will be unlikely to give away easily the increased leverage over local politics. There is little to be gained for the Party-state from easing controls in the area of civil liberties, and the forms of repression we witness currently might, at best, be allowed to fizzle out over a longer period of time. It is likely, however, that the central government will find it desirable to perpetuate at least some of the "emergency" powers gained in the name of a one-time event.
This was the general sentiment of the participants in CECC's roundtable as well. It appears that the Olympics have strengthened the Party's legitimacy, and thereby its mandate to control. There is, therefore, no reason to expect that they will willingly relinquish increased power, especially if the Olympic event is a success. Referring to Tibet, Ben Carduss -- emphasizing that his evidence was purely anecdotal -- noted the possibility that the Party will use the fading international spotlight of the post-Olympic period to deal a final blow to any resistance or dissident movements.
I am slightly more optimistic about the potential for post-Olympic reforms. While some may argue that the human rights condition in China may worsen following the Olympics, I argue that a post-Olympic cultural malaise will produce a general decline in the CCP's ability to proclaim itself the steward of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Communist Party relies heavily on major events such as the Olympics in creating a Chinese success story with the Party as hero. With no such event on the horizon following the Olympics, the notion of "social harmony" will also lose its power. There will be no justification for a "stability at all costs" type of policy. As a result, people will increasingly demand accountability and access to honest information, especially regarding health and environmental issues, property confiscations, and reconstruction of the areas hit hardest by the Sichuan earthquake.
During the roundtable discussion, speculation arose with regard to the next major influencing factor for the development of the rule of law in China. Ben Carduss mentioned increased pressure for China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But he also noted that written law isn't the problem; it's enforcement. While China may face increased pressure to ratify the ICCPR, and will most likely ultimately do so, another set of laws on the books in and of itself will do nothing to produce real reforms in practice.
The reality is that the international community -- at the official level -- has few, if any, remaining tools with which to influence China's domestic human rights situation. Absent a broad movement of international companies willingly linking their investments in China to progress in the human rights field -- governments are unlikely to force them to do so -- the next impact event will be internal. The likelihood of such an event increases as the intensity of the world's focus on China decreases.
http://cngovwatch.blogspot.com/2008/07/cecc-roundtable-716.html