PDA

View Full Version : Bu hewerni dunyadiki putun uyghurlar bilixi kerek



Unregistered
25-12-09, 15:05
Towendiki hewerni Uyghur tiligha terjime kilip beridighanlar barmu ? Bu makalini tezdin ottura asiyadiki heliklerge yetkuzsek , hitayning axu rayonlarni elip ketixining aldini alghili bolar idi . Hemde biz Uyghur helkige kaysi rayonlarning muhim rayonlikini we nedin ix baxlisak bizge muhimlikini bilgili bolidu .


China resets terms of engagement in Central Asia
12/23/2009 | Western Sources

Asia Times
Dec 24, 2009
By M K Bhadrakumar

Nursultan Nazarbayev has a way of drawing lines in the sand. The president of Kazakhstan recently told global oil and metal majors that new laws would allow only those foreign investors that cooperate with his industrialization program to tap his nation's mineral resources.

"We will work only with those who propose projects helping diversification of the economy," he said at a December 4 investment conference in Astana, the Kazakh capital, which was attended by ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC and other investors. To any unwilling to collaborate, he said: "We will look for new partners, offer them favorable conditions and resources to fulfill projects."

For good measure, he added that Beijing has asked Kazakhstan - a country the size of Europe but with just 16 million people - to allow Chinese farmers to use one million hectares of Kazakh land to cultivate crops such as soya and rape seed.

Pro-Western elements in Kazakh politics have since taken to the streets. On December 17, addressing a rally in Almaty, Bolat Abilov, co-chairman of the opposition party Azat [United Social Democratic Party] drew an apocalyptic scenario: "If we tomorrow give, or distribute, one million hectares of land, it would mean 15 people working per hectare. That means 15 million people would be brought from China. If one of those 15 people were to give birth each year, that would be the end. In 50 years, there would be 50 million Chinese [in Kazakhstan]."

A rally was held outside the Chinese consulate in Almaty with placards reading, "Mr Hu Jintao, we will not give up Kazakh land!"

A pipeline to the heart of Asia ...

Nazarbayev's message was direct: Western investors could keep their money if interested only in exploiting Kazakhstan's mineral wealth. The president was speaking as a momentous event in the history and politics of Central Asia was resetting the terms of engagement for foreigners in the region: the development of an ambitious 7,000 kilometer pipeline to link the region's gas fields to cities on China's eastern seaboard.

Ten days after Nazarbayev spoke, Hu arrived on a Central Asian tour for the formal commissioning of the 1,833-kilometer pipeline connecting gas fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (and possibly Russia) to China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Turkmenistan says it alone can supply 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year through the pipeline for three decades once it reaches full capacity. That is about half China's current annual consumption.

Uzbekistan signed an agreement with China in November last year to export up to 10 bcm gas a year. (A 2006 estimate put Uzbekistan's gas reserves at 1.8 trillion cubic meters.) A branch line of the Turkmen-China trunk pipeline passes through the town of Gazli, in the Bukhara region, where the Uzbek gas can be fed into it. China has invested in the Uzbek gas fields in the region. The Uzbek reserves are primarily concentrated in the Qashqadaryo province and near Bukhara alongside which the Chinese pipeline passes.

Kazakhstan is set to export another 10 bcm gas through another branch pipeline connection. China, which is preparing for a massive increase in consumption, wants natural gas to account for 10% of its energy mix by 2020, from 3% in 2005. China consumed 77.8 bcm of natural gas last year, a little more than its domestic output of 77.5 bcm. However, the nation faces a natural gas shortage of 70-110 bcm by 2020, according to the 2009 Energy Development Report published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, an official think-tank. All China's gas imports are currently in the form of LNG and it is separately raising its LNG import capacity to 15 million to 18 million tons by the end of next year.

There was widespread skepticism among observers whether the Central Asia pipeline project would see the light of day. Indeed, China pushed ahead against Western views that last year's renewed unrest in Xinjiang put it at risk. "China is putting a lot of eggs in one basket,' one British expert said. "An awful lot of oil and gas is coming through a small region. Looking now at trends in Xinjiang, you could ask whether a route from Central Asia is actually more secure than routes through Southeast Asia or the South China Sea."

The implication was obvious: that China's Central Asian pipeline could become a sitting duck for terrorists. As Robert Ebel, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it, security could be impossible if the pipelines become targets as they pass through vast stretches of sparsely populated areas in Central Asia and Xinjiang. "There is no way you can protect a pipeline along its entire length. It just can't be done", Ebel, a security expert, maintained. Unrest in Xinjiang, particularly, threatens the Central Asian pipeline, he added. "I'm sure it's causing grey hairs on the people in Beijing," he said.

... sends shock waves to Washington

The American experts have drawn a doomsday scenario for the Chinese pipeline. Writing in the Central Asia & Caucasus Institute Analyst of Johns Hopkins University in October last year, Stephen Blank of the US War College branded Xinjiang as a "pressure cooker" which Beijing is nowhere near controlling.

Growing nervousness in Washington about the Chinese pipeline was quite palpable. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a rare hearing in July regarding China's geopolitical thrust into the Central Asian region. Testifying at the hearing, Richard Morningstar, the US special envoy for energy, underlined that the US needed to develop strategies to compete with China for energy in Central Asia.

This was perhaps the first time that a senior US official has openly flagged China as the US's rival in the energy politics of Central Asia. US experts usually have focused attention on Russian dominance of the region's energy scene and worked for diminishing the Russian presence in the post-Soviet space by canvassing support for Trans-Caspian projects that bypassed Russian territory. In fact, some American experts on the region even argued that China was a potential US ally for isolating Russia.

Certainly, 2009 was a turning point in American discourses on Chinese policies in Central Asia. As China's Turkmen gas pipeline got closer to completion, US disquiet began to surface.

"China is having increasing and heavy influence in Central Asia,' Morningstar said. ``It is hard for us [the US] to compete with China in some of these countries. It's easy for Turkmenistan to make a deal with China when China comes in and says, 'Hey, we're going to write a check for X amount of money, we're going to build a pipeline'. That's not a hard deal to accept, and we [US] can't compete in that way."

Morningstar put forward two suggestions. One, "to develop a strategy to deal with that [Chinese policy] and encourage the US companies to negotiate creatively with Turkmenistan". Two, Washington should also think about whether it makes sense for US companies to cooperate with China in such countries.

Scope for US-China cooperation over Central Asian energy resources is very limited. In geopolitical terms, there is a conflict of interest between the two countries. One principal objective of China is to lock in energy sources that are not dependent on supply routes passing through the Malacca Straits, which the US controls and could prove a choke point in the event of a US-China confrontation.

Besides, Morningstar himself put his finger on the crux of the problem. While it was good for China's energy-hungry economy to get "clean energy" such as natural gas, the "gas that goes to China competes with gas that could go westward".

Beijing raises the stakes ...

However, the US realizes that devising a counterstrategy to China's is easier said than done. China's presence in the Central Asian energy scene was not a single day's happening. Painstaking diplomacy spread over years went behind it. It was back in 1997 that Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a 3,000 km crude oil pipeline and would later double capacity to 20 million tonnes a year.

In 2005, CNPC International paid almost $4 billion for a 33% stake in PetroKazakhstan. The following year China bought up Kazakh oil assets worth nearly $2 billion in the Karazhanba oil and gas fields (which has proven reserves of more than 340 million barrels), agreed to purchase 30 bcm gas from Turkmenistan ((later increasing this to 40 bcm), and committed $210 million to look for oil and gas in Uzbekistan over the next five years.

In 2008, Kazakhstan and China agreed on jointly developing oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea, while China's Guangdong Nuclear Power Co and Kazakhstan's state nuclear firm Kazatomprom agreed on boosting uranium output in their joint venture.

In April 2009, China made the mother of all energy deals by agreeing to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion in an unprecedented "loan-for-oil" deal and also agreed with state-owned KazMunaiGas to jointly buy oil producer MangistauMunaiGas for $3.3 billion.

In 2009, China also agreed to issue a $3 billion loan for developing the Central Asian state's largest gas field, South Iolotan, which is estimated to contain anywhere between 4 trillion and 14 trillion cubic meters of gas, according to Britain's Gaffney, Cline and Associates - making it one of the world's five largest gas deposits.

By the time the US woke up to China having a clear energy strategy for Central Asia, the strategy was already working. Western calculations went awry in two directions. First, they estimated that, in the ultimate analysis, Central Asian states would be wary of dealing with their giant neighbor and prefer Russia and the West. Second, they blindly assumed that Russia in any case was bound to perceive the Chinese gains as a threat to its own strategic interests and would therefore resist and checkmate Beijing at some stage, indirectly serving Western interests.

To the dismay of the West, not only have the Central Asian states warmed to Chinese overtures, but they are basking in all the Chinese attention and relishing the harder bargains they are able to strike in negotiating prices and contracts with Western companies.

Again, China's engagement in Central Asia has been comprehensive and not confined to oil and gas. Central Asians have been seeking precisely such input from foreign countries as Nazarbayev voiced in Astana. Speaking to Chinese media in Ashgabat on the eve of Hu's arrival for the commissioning of the gas pipeline on December 14, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov highlighted repeatedly how his country's relations with China have become "multi-faceted".

"They now cover all major areas - politics, economy, trade, culture, science, education,' Berdymukhamedov said. "And, so, of course, there are a lot of topics for discussion during our meeting with the president of China. The main thing is that they all have a positive context, the very favorable background as the basis for negotiations, and their starting position on both sides favors complete mutual understanding and trust, equality and respect, unity of views on key issues of world politics and bilateral relations."

Western experts often speak in a dismissive tone that the Central Asians prefer the Chinese because they never raise difficult issues such as democracy and human rights. But this is far too simplistic a reading. Central Asian countries see Western discourse on democracy and human rights as doublespeak from countries that pander to authoritarian regimes without scruples when it suits their business interests.

Central Asian countries draw satisfaction that eventually Washington is no more trampling on the region's sensitivities and ethos. The fashion in which Uzbekistan taught an enduring lesson to the European Union and the US regarding mutual respect and equitable relationship was widely noted in the region's capitals.

But that is only part of the story. The main thing is that China has reset the terms of the West's engagement with Central Asia. Western countries need to negotiate hard with Central Asian interlocutors squarely. Secondly, while they are under compulsion to abandon the cherry-picking approach they once took - touching the region's precious minerals and shying away from any further involvement such as in the manufacturing sector or agriculture - the ground rules of engagement that Nazarbayev spelt out at the investors' forum in Astana give a foretaste of what is to come.

China's track record in Turkmenistan displays the new standards for the west. China-Turkmenistan trade has jumped 40 times since 2000; 35 enterprises are working in Turkmenistan today with Chinese capital. Chinese companies are active in sectors of the Turkmen economy as diverse as oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, agriculture, textile, chemical and food industries, healthcare and construction.

From Ashgabat's point of view, China's interest in comprehensive engagement with the Turkmen political economy stands in contrast with the predatory instincts of the Western companies that zero in on the mineral industry with maniacal zeal. Certainly, in the process, China also ends up taking a big share of the Turkmen energy sector.

... but reassures Moscow

The second aspect to be noted is that with the commencement of China's Central Asia pipeline, Russia's post-Soviet control of gas exports from Central Asia has ended. The American commentators have tried to propagate this in terms of China's gain turning out to be Russia's loss. But it isn't quite a zero-sum game in that sense. Beijing has been unusually forthright in discussing the delicate issue of whether China is locked into competition with Russia over Central Asia's energy.

"China is pursuing diversification of energy imports, while the Central Asian countries are pursuing diversification of exports,' said Zhang Xiyuan, the Chinese foreign ministry official briefing the press on Hu's visit to Ashgabat. "This kind of cooperation will naturally continue and has room to develop."

In other words, China's cooperation with Central Asia rests on a convergence of mutual interests. Chinese commentaries have stressed that "export diversification" as a strategic option has became necessary for Central Asian countries after the financial crisis and as European countries' demand for the region's natural gas has decreased.

Pan Guang, director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies and a prominent scholar, says China's "huge foreign-exchange purchasing capacity and advantageous geographical position is extremely attractive" to the gas exporters of Central Asia. China's energy cooperation will also promote development of non-energy industries in the region such as chemical, agricultural, transport infrastructure construction and light industries, according to the Chinese analysts. Russia's security interests would also be served, as unemployment, a root of instability, will be cut, they said.

Taking all factors into account, therefore, the People's Daily newspaper concluded that the Chinese pipeline was an opportunity for Russia.

"Some people in Russia are concerned and media agencies have exaggerated the event to attract public attention, asserting that China will become Russia's major strategic competitor in the Central Asian energy industry,' the newspaper said. "In fact, it is not the case.

"Experts believe that the pipeline can transport natural gas produced both in Turkmenistan and in Russia ... [the] China-Russia pipeline mainly transports oil and natural gas produced in the eastern Siberian region. It is difficult to transport natural gas produced in both the western Siberian region and Russia's European part, so the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline will perhaps act as a 'key' to addressing the issue.

"In addition, the natural gas cooperation between China and Central Asia is open and non-exclusive, and does not seize Russia's market or compete with Russia for resources," the People's Daily said.

In essence, the Chinese argument is that while the Turkmen-Uzbek-Kazakh pipeline possibly makes inroads into Europe's energy options it won't hurt Russia's interests. The argument is well founded. With the commissioning of the Turkmen gas pipeline, there is no doubt that US and European energy diplomacy in Central Asia has been rendered a lethal body blow.

Through one mega project, Beijing has what Moscow has been striving for over a decade with a piecemeal approach. The European Union's chances of winning Turkmen supplies for its US-backed Nabucco pipeline project (connecting the Caspian with southern Europe) now seem severely diminished. Moscow can heave a sigh of relief, as the Nabucco project planned to cut Russia out of Europe's direct gas trade with the Caspian.

Therefore, if there is a zero-sum game, it is like this: China's gain is Europe's loss, which in turn can be Russia's gain since Russian gas is now certain to remain Europe's main energy source for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, Europe's continued dependence on Russian energy constitutes a vital chip for Moscow in its efforts to forge partnerships with major European countries.

Indeed, Russia can now advance its ambitious North Stream and South Stream gas pipelines to Europe without constantly having to look over its shoulder for competition from rival US-backed Trans-Caspian pipelines such as Nabucco.

Again, the US and Europe couldn't have missed the Chinese warning that Beijing intends to make a serious bid at some time for the Russian gas produced in its western Siberian region as well as its European part (which are at present the principal sources of supply for Europe). In effect, China has projected itself as a competing consumer of Russian gas.

All in all, the Chinese pipeline considerably strengthens Russia's stance. This probably explains the quiet satisfaction in Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's voice when he was asked about the implications of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline.

"The commissioning of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is not going to affect our plans to expand our own pipeline network, which could possibly also reach China,' Putin said. "I am referring to China's growing consumption of primary energy resources. We maintain regular, close contact with our Chinese colleagues on this issue. We know how fast the demand is growing there, and they too are closely monitoring the situation. The gas link to Turkmenistan will not undermine our plans."

Most important, the "loss" of Turkmen gas for Nabucco means that the project itself now critically depends on sourcing Iranian gas. In other words, Iran figures prominently in any serious European plans (strongly backed by the US) to diversify its gas imports so as to cut down dependence on Russian energy supplies.

US draws Central Asia into AfPak ...

To be sure, 2009 will be noted by historians as a landmark year for Central Asian security. For the first time in the post-Soviet period, a truly regional project has taken shape in Central Asia. It is a novel experience for a region torn asunder by numerous intra-regional tensions, irritants and misunderstandings - be it over water-sharing, Islamists, the environment or the "great game". This was underscored by the presence of the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the ceremony launching the Turkmen gas pipeline project.

It cannot be lost on the Central Asian elites that China has made such a high level of regional cooperation possible. Hu in his speech at the ceremony cited the Turkmen pipeline as a model of regional cooperation. China is reaping the benefit of some 15 years of patient, painstaking diplomacy. It will now be a Herculean task for the West to whip up Sinophobia among the Central Asians.

At the same time, China is assuming an enormous responsibility in the region as at no time previously. The gas pipeline makes China a "stakeholder" in Central Asian security. The bond now goes far beyond fighting the three forces of "terrorism, separatism and extremism", which was how China focused its phenomenally successful diplomacy in the mid-1990s.

Looking ahead, the coming year will see the US intensify efforts to counter China's influence in Central Asia. The alarm bells are ringing in Washington. At the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee special hearing on Central Asia on December 15, George Krol, the deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, said: "This administration does not consider Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to US interests. The region is at the fulcrum of key US security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts and the Obama administration [is committed] to this very approach." [Emphasis added.]

Never before has an American official stated US intentions towards post-Soviet Central Asia in such strong words. Indeed, there is an implied warning to Beijing that the US is watching its forays into the region closely and will not let them pass without challenge.

From present indications, the US attempt is to widen the gyre of its AfPak strategy so as to draw the Central Asian region into it. In empirical terms, a case already exists for including the region in the AfPak strategy. For one thing, the Northern Corridor for supply of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingents in Afghanistan and the sourcing of materials from the region for Afghan reconstruction already make the regional governments important collaborators in the war effort.

The increased presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan can only lead to a bigger role for Central Asian countries that is bound to bring them into a closer working relationship. There is also reason to believe that the Afghan war has already spilt over to Central Asia. The exact background to this remains open to interpretation but the fact is that there has been a spurt in militant activities in Central Asia (and Xinjiang).

Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol framed it diplomatically by underlining that a policy priority of the US will be "to expand cooperation with the Central Asian states to assist coalition efforts to defeat extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bring stability and prosperity to the region". This goes hand in hand with the effort to "increase the development and diversification of the region's energy resources and supply routes".

Potential threats that could come from Central Asia, apart from the possibility of "state failure" would compel the US to pay close attention to the region, Krol said. He also invoked archetypal fears about terrorists getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, which has proved a useful argument for substantiating US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"While these [Central Asian] countries voluntarily relinquished their nuclear arsenals after the fall of the Soviet Union, today the region is still engaged in activities relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, namely, uranium mining, plutonium production and the fabrication and testing of biological and chemical weapons," Krol said.

In a measure of US determination to place itself in a lead role in Central Asia, the Obama administration has announced the constitution of a new framework of annual high-level bilateral dialogue with each of the region's countries.

... as it runs out of options

US interests would have been best served if Russia and China were at loggerheads in Central Asia. But that does not seem to be the way things are happening.

Moscow looks favorably on China's investments in Central Asia, according to Stephen Blank of the US War College. "By opening the RFE [Russian Far East] to Chinese investment and blessing similar investments in Central Asia, Moscow is reversing its policies toward both the Far East and Central Asia,' Blank wrote in August. "In effect, this and other similar deals open the door to a huge expansion - with Moscow's assent - of China's strategic profile in both regions. The creation of a new regional order in the RFE and Central Asia is beginning to take shape and China is set to become the region's security manager, ensuring foremost that its portfolio investments are safe and secure."

The shift in the Kremlin's traditional policy with regard to the RFE has been necessitated largely by the downturn in the Russian economy following the global economic crisis and the sharp drop in oil revenue. Moscow was pursuing a policy aimed at developing the RFE and eastern Siberia almost exclusively through revenues from energy exports to Europe. But with the slackening energy demand in the European market and sharply reduced income from exports, the Kremlin cannot sustain the pursuit of such a dogged policy option anymore. It has been compelled to rethink.

This was evident in May when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev admitted that the development of the RFE needed to be coordinated with Beijing's regional strategy of rejuvenating northeast China's dilapidated industrial base. Unsurprisingly, the Russian policy shift also implies the jettisoning of any attempt to prevent Chinese economic penetration of Central Asia.

Secondly, Moscow faces difficulty in underwriting the security and stability of the Central Asian region on its own steam. This is despite the region's direct impact on Russia's national security interests. At the same time, Moscow has a congruence of interests with China in forestalling NATO's expansion into the Central Asia's security. The interplay of these factors encourages Moscow to regard favorably the stepping up of Chinese involvement in Central Asia.

Of course, writings appear in the Russian media occasionally about China's economic "conquest" of Central Asia, but official policy does not seem to encourage such a perspective. The new thinking in Moscow with regard to Chinese investments in RFE and Central Asia may have already begun to pay off. Medvedev claimed during a visit by Hu to Moscow in June that Russia and China had clinched deals worth $100 billion by a "special mechanism" facilitating massive Chinese investments in regional projects. It is going to be very difficult for the US to disrupt these plans. As Blank put it: "For all those who are watching for the emergence of China as a dominant economic and political player in Asia, these new deals with Russia have a profound significance that we overlook at our peril."

China has the huge advantage of financial muscle. It can simply outspend the US or European countries. Short of stoking the fires of militancy and ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, the US may have run out of options to disrupt China's emerging leadership in Central Asia. On its part, Beijing knows that the stability of Xinjiang is crucial for China's Central Asia policy - and vice versa. The two have become inextricably linked in the Chinese regional strategy.

Beijing knows that "foreign devils on the Silk Road" - militant groups with foreign backers - can harass China by blowing up long stretches of the pipelines which are impractical for Beijing to protect in Xinjiang's vast mountains and deserts. That is one solid reason why Beijing has not been taken in by the US overtures for cooperation in Afghanistan nor is enamored by Obama's standing invitation to step into South Asia as the arbiter of peace and regional security.

Beijing is extremely wary of the hidden intentions behind the Afghan strategy Obama recently unveiled. In fact, Chinese criticism of the US troop surge in Afghanistan has become quite forceful lately. Last Thursday, the People's Daily wrote:

Yes, sometimes history does recur ... The shadow of the Vietnam War even now still hovers ... what unfolds is replicating the model in Iraq, and further back, in Vietnam.

The war-torn Afghan population will not side with the slumbering Karzai government nor will they welcome the US presence. On the other hand, the bigger footprint made by the enhanced US troops and its NATO allies only help fuel the insurgency and trigger more fierce resistance ... Taliban dies hard.

The predicament facing the US and the one-year old Obama administration is that at the time, there seems no policy that can reverse the undoing in Afghanistan, even with more troops and better-placed tactics. But the young president will try whatever he can to steer clear of the pitfall that would turn the superpower into an occupying power.

China (and Russia) have reason to be on guard that Obama's Afghan surge and the new strategy as a whole essentially aim at pursuing longstanding US strategic interests of controlling Central Asia and containing Russia and China through "soft power" - methods different from those of the previous US administrations. Clearly, the Russian-Chinese cooperation in Central Asia factors in the US game plan in the Hindu Kush, which is shrouded in mystery. Having said that, China will also find it worrisome that Russia tends to speak in two voices at times about its ties with NATO within the "reset" of relations with the US.

The specter of an open-ended US military presence in the region haunts China. After all, China was the US's accomplice against the Soviet Union in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and should know that Washington has myriad ways to make use of radical and extremist elements as instruments of geopolitics. China can see right in front of its eyes the horrible example of its "all-weather friend" Pakistan, which by associating with US strategy in Afghanistan has been dragged into the vortex of instability and become the target of religious extremists and militants.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.








Uyghur American Association (UAA)
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 349-1496 :: Fax: (202) 349-1491 :: Email: info@uyghuramerican.org

Unregistered
25-12-09, 15:49
(Übersetzung von Englisch in DeutschLateinische Umschrift anzeigen)


China setzt hinsichtlich des Engagements in Zentralasien
12/23/2009 | Western Quellen

Asia Times
24. Dezember 2009
Von M K Bhadrakumar

Nursultan Nazarbayev hat eine Art, das Zeichnen von Linien in den Sand. Der Präsident von Kasachstan sagte vor kurzem in globalen Öl-und Metall-Majors, die neuen Gesetze würde nur die ausländischen Investoren, die mit seinem Programm zur Industrialisierung seines Landes Bodenschätzen tippen zusammenzuarbeiten.

"Wir arbeiten nur mit denen, die Projekte unterstützen die Diversifizierung der Wirtschaft vorschlagen wird", sagte er am 4. Dezember ein Investment-Konferenz in Astana, der kasachischen Hauptstadt, die von ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC und andere Investoren teilnahmen. Um alle bereit zur Zusammenarbeit, sagte er: "Wir werden nach neuen Partnern suchen, bieten ihnen günstige Voraussetzungen zu erfüllen und die Ressourcen für die Projekte."

Für eine gute Maßnahme, fügte er hinzu, dass Peking Kasachstan beantragt hat - ein Land von der Größe Europas, sondern mit nur 16 Millionen Menschen - zu ermöglichen chinesischen Bauern zu einer Million Hektar Land Kasachisch verwenden, um Nutzpflanzen wie Soja und Raps anzubauen.

Pro-westliche Elemente in der kasachischen Politik haben, da auf die Straße gegangen. Am 17. Dezember Adressierung einer Kundgebung in Almaty, Bolat Abilow, Ko-Vorsitzender der Oppositionspartei Azat [Vereinigte Sozialdemokratische Partei] zog eine apokalyptische Szenario: "Wenn wir morgen zu geben, oder zu verbreiten, eine Million Hektar Land, würde dies bedeuten, 15 Menschen, die pro Hektar. Das bedeutet, dass 15 Millionen Menschen würden aus China gebracht werden. Wenn einer dieser 15 Personen wurden zu gebären jedes Jahr, das wäre das Ende. In 50 Jahren, gäbe es 50 Millionen Chinesen [in Kasachstan] . "

Eine Rallye wurde vor dem chinesischen Konsulat in Almaty mit Plakaten Lesung statt, "Herr Hu Jintao, wir werden nicht aufgeben, Kasachisch Land!"

Eine Pipeline in das Herz Asiens ...

Nasarbajew Nachricht wurde direkt: Westliche Investoren könnten ihr Geld zu behalten, wenn nur interessiert, bei der Verwertung mineralischer Kasachstan Reichtum. Der Präsident hielt seine Rede in ein bedeutsames Ereignis in der Geschichte und Politik in Zentralasien wurde das Zurücksetzen in den Auftrag für Ausländer in der Region: die Entwicklung eines ehrgeizigen 7000 km Pipeline in der Region Gasfelder in die Städte an der Ostküste Chinas zu verbinden.

Zehn Tage nach Nasarbajew sprach, kam Hu auf einer Mittel-Asien-Tournee für die formale Inbetriebnahme der 1.833-Kilometer-Pipeline verbindet Gasvorkommen in Turkmenistan, Usbekistan und Kasachstan (und vielleicht auch Russland) nach Xinjiang in China Autonomen Region.

Turkmenistan sagt sie allein 40 Milliarden Kubikmeter (Mrd. m³) Erdgas pro Jahr durch die Pipeline für drei Jahrzehnten liefern, sobald es volle Kapazität erreicht. Dass etwa die Hälfte Chinas gegenwärtige jährliche Verbrauch ist.

Usbekistan unterzeichnet ein Abkommen mit China im November vergangenen Jahres für den Export von bis zu 10 Mrd m³ Gas pro Jahr. (A 2006 Schätzung legte Usbekistan Gasreserven auf 1,8 Billionen Kubikmeter.) Eine Nebenlinie der turkmenischen Stamm-China-Pipeline führt durch die Stadt Gazli in der Region Buchara, wo die usbekische Gas in sie eingespeist werden kann. China hat in der usbekischen Gasfelder in der Region investiert. Die usbekische behält sich vor allem in der Kaschkadarja konzentriert und in der Nähe von Buchara, die neben den chinesischen Pipeline verläuft.

Kasachstan wird weitere 10 Mrd m³ Gas, über einen anderen Zweig Pipeline-Anbindung zu exportieren. China, die Vorbereitung für einen massiven Anstieg des Verbrauchs, will Erdgas für 10% des Energiemix im Jahr 2020 von 3% im Jahr 2005. China verbraucht 77,8 Mrd. Kubikmeter Erdgas im vergangenen Jahr ein wenig mehr als die inländische Produktion von 77,5 Milliarden Kubikmeter. Allerdings steht die Nation ein Mangel an Erdgas 70-110 Milliarden Kubikmeter im Jahr 2020, nach dem 2009 veröffentlichten Bericht die Entwicklung der Energiewirtschaft von der chinesischen Akademie der Sozialwissenschaften, eine offizielle Think-Tank. Alle Chinas Gaseinfuhren befinden sich in der Form von LNG und es wird gesondert die Erhöhung seiner Kapazitäten für die LNG-Import von 15 Million bis 18 Mio. Tonnen bis zum Ende des nächsten Jahres.

Es gab weit verbreitete Skepsis unter den Beobachtern, ob die Zentralasien-Pipeline-Projekt das Licht der Welt erblicken würde. In der Tat, stieß vor China gegen westliche Ansichten, die im vergangenen Jahr erneut Unruhen in Xinjiang put it in Gefahr. "China ist ein Putting viel Eier in einen Korb", ein britischer Experte. "Eine ganze Menge von Öl und Gas kommt durch eine kleine Region. Blicken wir nun auf die Trends in Xinjiang, könnten Sie fragen, ob eine Route aus Zentralasien tatsächlich ist sicherer als die Routen durch Südostasien oder das Südchinesische Meer. "

Die Konsequenz war klar: das ist China's Central Asian Pipeline ein leichtes Opfer für Terroristen werden könnte. Wie Robert Ebel, legte am Zentrum für Strategische und Internationale Studien in Washington, es könnte die Sicherheit nicht möglich, wenn die Leitungen Ziele, als sie sich über weite Strecken der dünn besiedelten Gebiete in Zentralasien und Xinjiang weiterzugeben. "Es gibt keine Möglichkeit, eine Pipeline über seine gesamte Länge zu schützen. Es kann einfach nicht gemacht werden", Ebel, ein Sicherheitsexperte, instand zu halten. Unruhen in Xinjiang, insbesondere, droht die zentralasiatischen Pipeline, fügte er hinzu. "Ich bin sicher, es verursacht graue Haare auf die Menschen in Peking", sagte er.

... sendet Schockwellen in Washington

Die amerikanischen Experten haben ein Weltuntergangsszenario für den chinesischen Pipeline erstellt. Writing in Zentralasien und Kaukasus Analyst Institut der Johns Hopkins University im Oktober letzten Jahres, Stephen Blank der US War College Marke Xinjiang als "Schnellkochtopf", die Peking ist in keiner Weise kontrolliert.

Wachsende Nervosität in Washington über die chinesische Pipeline war ganz spürbar. Die US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hielt eine seltene Anhörung im Juli in Bezug auf geopolitische China's Vorstoß in der zentralasiatischen Region. In seiner Aussage in der mündlichen Verhandlung, Richard Morningstar, dem US-Sondergesandten für Energie, unterstrich, dass die USA erforderlich, um Strategien, um mit China konkurrieren für Energie in Zentralasien zu entwickeln.

Dies war vielleicht das erste Mal, dass ein hochrangiger US-Beamter offen ist gekennzeichnet China als Rivalen der USA in der Energie-Politik in Zentralasien. US-Experten haben in der Regel die Aufmerksamkeit auf die russische Vorherrschaft der Energieversorgung der Region Szene konzentriert und arbeitete für die Verminderung der russischen Präsenz in der post-sowjetischen Raum, um Unterstützung für transkaspische Projekte, die umgangen russischem Hoheitsgebiet. In der Tat, einige amerikanische Experten in der Region sogar behauptet, dass China eine potenzielle Verbündete der USA zur Isolierung von Russland war.

Sicher, 2009 war ein Wendepunkt in der amerikanischen Diskurse über die chinesische Politik in Zentralasien. Als Chinas turkmenischen Gas-Pipeline näher kam zum Abschluss, begannen US Unruhe an die Oberfläche.

"China ist mit steigenden und schwere Einfluss in Zentralasien", sagte Morningstar. `` Es ist schwer für uns [den USA], um mit China in einigen dieser Länder konkurrieren. Es ist einfach für Turkmenistan ein Abkommen mit China zu machen, wenn China kommt und sagt: "Hey, wir werden einen Scheck über X Geldbetrag zu schreiben, werden wir den Bau einer Pipeline." Das ist nicht schwer viel zu akzeptieren, und wir [US] kann nicht in diesem Wettbewerb Weg. "

Morningstar brachte zwei Vorschläge. Eins, um "eine Strategie, um damit umzugehen [chinesischen Politik] und die US-Unternehmen zu fördern, um kreativ mit Turkmenistan zu verhandeln" zu entwickeln. Zwei, sollte Washington auch darüber nachdenken, ob es Sinn macht für US-Unternehmen zur Zusammenarbeit mit China in diesen Ländern.

Spielraum für eine amerikanisch-chinesische Zusammenarbeit in den zentralasiatischen Energieressourcen ist sehr begrenzt. In geopolitischer Hinsicht gibt es einen Interessenkonflikt zwischen den beiden Ländern. Ein Hauptziel ist es, in China Energiequellen, die nicht auf Versorgungswege, die durch die Straße von Malakka, die die US-Kontrolle und könnte sich eine Drossel Punkt im Falle eines US-China Konfrontation angewiesen sind, zu sperren.

Außerdem Morningstar selbst legte den Finger auf den Kern des Problems. Es war zwar für Energie in China gut hungrig Wirtschaft, um "saubere Energie", wie Erdgas, die "Gas, das geht nach China konkurriert mit Gas, das nach Westen gehen" könnten.

Peking erhöht den Einsatz ...

Allerdings erkennt die USA, dass die Entwicklung einer Gegenstrategie zu China ist leichter gesagt als getan. China Präsenz in der zentralasiatischen Energie-Szene war nicht einen einzigen Tag passiert. Gewissenhafte Diplomatie die sich auf Jahre vergingen dahinter. Es war im Jahr 1997, dass Kasachstan und China vereinbart, ein 3.000 km Erdöl-Pipeline bauen und später doppelte Kapazität auf 20 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr.

Im Jahr 2005 zahlte CNPC International fast 4 Mrd. Dollar für eine 33% ige Beteiligung an PetroKazakhstan. Im folgenden Jahr China aufgekauft Kasachischen Öl-Aktiva im Wert von fast 2 Milliarden Dollar in den Karazhanba Öl-und Gasfelder (die Reserven von mehr als 340 Mio. Barrel nachgewiesen) einigten sich auf 30 Milliarden Kubikmeter Erdgas aus Turkmenistan Kauf ((später Erhöhung dieser auf 40 Mrd. m³) und engagiert $ 210 Mio. für Öl und Gas in Usbekistan Blick über die nächsten fünf Jahre.

Im Jahr 2008 einigten sich Kasachstan und China entwickeln gemeinsam Öl-und Gasreserven auf dem Schelf des Kaspischen Meeres, während China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co. und Kasachstan den Zustand der nuklearen Kazatomprom Unternehmen einigten sich auf die Förderung von Uran-Ausgang in ihrem Joint Venture.

Im April 2009 machte China die Mutter aller Angebote, die Energie durch die Zustimmung zu verleihen Kasachstan 10 Milliarden Dollar in einer beispiellosen "Kredit-für-Öl" befassen und auch vereinbart, mit dem staatlichen Unternehmen KazMunaiGas gemeinsam Ölproduzent MangistauMunaiGas für 3,3 Milliarden Dollar kaufen.

Im Jahr 2009 wird China außerdem überein, eine 3 Milliarden Dollar Kredit für die Entwicklung des zentralasiatischen Staates größte Gasfeld Frage, nämlich South Iolotan, schätzungsweise zwischen 4 Billionen und 14 Billionen Kubikmeter Gas enthalten, nach Gaffney Großbritanniens, Cline & Associates - was ihn zu einem der fünf weltweit größten Erdgasvorkommen.

Als die US-wachte nach China eine klare energiepolitische Strategie für Zentralasien, war die Strategie schon arbeiten kann. Western Berechnungen schief ging in zwei Richtungen. Erstens haben sie geschätzt, dass in letzter Instanz, zentralasiatischen Staaten würden im Umgang mit ihren riesigen Nachbarn und bevorzugen Russland und dem Westen der Hut sein. Zweitens, sie blind davon aus, dass Russland in jedem Fall verpflichtet gewesen sei, sehen die Chinesen Gewinne als eine Bedrohung für seine eigenen strategischen Interessen und würde daher zu widerstehen und Schachmatt Peking zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt mittelbar westlichen Interessen dient.

Zum Entsetzen des Westens, nicht nur über die zentralasiatischen Staaten für chinesische Ouvertüren erwärmt, aber sie sonnen sich in alle chinesischen Aufmerksamkeit und genießt die schwerer Schnäppchen sind in der Lage in der Aushandlung von Preisen und Verträgen mit westlichen Unternehmen zu finden.

Auch hier hat das chinesische Engagement in Zentralasien wurden umfassende und nicht auf Öl und Gas beschränkt. Central Asiaten haben versucht genau diese Beiträge aus dem Ausland, wie zum Ausdruck gebracht Nasarbajew in Astana. Im Gespräch mit chinesischen Medien in Aschgabat am Vorabend der Ankunft Hu für die Inbetriebnahme des Gas-Pipeline am 14. Dezember hervorgehoben turkmenischen Präsidenten Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov immer wieder, wie sein Land die Beziehungen mit China geworden sind "facettenreiche".

"Sie decken nun alle wichtigen Bereichen - Politik, Wirtschaft, Handel, Kultur, Wissenschaft, Bildung, 'Berdymukhamedov. Sagte:" Und ja, natürlich gibt es eine Menge von Themen für die Diskussion während unserer Treffen mit dem Präsidenten von China. Die Hauptsache ist, dass sie alle einen positiven Zusammenhang ist die sehr positive Erfahrung als Grundlage für die Verhandlungen und ihre Startposition auf beiden Seiten begünstigt vollständige gegenseitige Verständnis und Vertrauen, Gleichheit und Respekt, die Einheit der Ansichten zu zentralen Fragen der Weltpolitik und bilateralen Beziehungen. "

Westliche Experten sprechen oft in einem abweisenden Ton, dass die Zentrale die Asiaten Chinesen, weil sie nie zu erhöhen schwierige Themen wie Demokratie und Menschenrechte bevorzugen. Aber das ist viel zu einfach eine Lesung. Zentralasiatischen Länder sehen westlichen Diskurs über Demokratie und Menschenrechte als Doppelzüngigkeit aus Ländern, die schmeicheln autoritäre Regime ohne Skrupel, wenn es passt ihrer Geschäftsinteressen.

Zentralasiatischen Länder zu ziehen Befriedigung fest, dass schließlich Washington ist nicht mehr mit Füßen zu treten Empfindlichkeiten der Region und Ethos. Die Mode in Usbekistan unterrichtet, die eine dauerhafte Lehre für die Europäische Union und den USA über gegenseitige Achtung und gleichberechtigte Beziehungen wurde weitgehend in den Hauptstädten der Region hingewiesen.

Aber das ist nur ein Teil der Geschichte. Die Hauptsache ist, dass China die Bedingungen des Engagements des Westens mit Zentralasien Reset hat. Westlichen Ländern verhandeln müssen hart mit den zentralasiatischen Gesprächspartner quadratisch. Zweitens, während sie unter dem Zwang der cherry-picking-Ansatz aufzugeben sie einmal war - Berührung der Region wertvolle Mineralien und scheuen weitere Beteiligung wie in der verarbeitenden Industrie oder Landwirtschaft - die Grundregeln des Engagements, dass Nasarbajew dargelegt in der Forum der Anleger in Astana geben einen Vorgeschmack auf das, was kommen wird.

China's Track Record in Turkmenistan zeigt die neue Maßstäbe für den Westen. China und Turkmenistan Handel gesprungen ist 40-mal seit dem Jahr 2000; 35 Unternehmen arbeiten in Turkmenistan heute mit chinesischen Hauptstadt. Chinesische Unternehmen sind in Bereichen der turkmenischen Wirtschaft so vielfältig wie Öl und Gas, Telekommunikation, Verkehr, Landwirtschaft, Textil-, Chemie-und Lebensmittelindustrie, Gesundheitswesen und Bau tätig.

Aus Sicht Ashgabat aus gesehen, steht Chinas Interesse an umfassenden Auseinandersetzung mit der turkmenischen politischen Ökonomie im Gegensatz zu den räuberischen Instinkte der westlichen Unternehmen, die Null auf die Mineral-Industrie mit manischen Eifer. Sicher, in den Prozess, China endet auch bis unter einen großen Anteil der turkmenischen Energiesektor.

... aber versichert, Moskau

Der zweite Aspekt zu beachten ist, dass mit dem Beginn der Central China's Asia-Pipeline, Russia's post-sowjetische Kontrolle von Gas aus Zentralasien zu Ende ist. Der amerikanische Kommentatoren haben versucht, diese im Hinblick auf die Verstärkung in China zu verbreiten erweist sich Russland Verlust. Aber es ist nicht ganz ein Null-Summen-Spiel in diesem Sinne. Peking ist ungewöhnlich unverblümt bei der Erörterung der heiklen Frage, ob China ist gesperrt, in Konkurrenz mit Russland über Energie Zentralasien ist.

"China verfolgt Diversifizierung der Energieimporte, während die zentralasiatischen Länder Diversifizierung der Exporte verfolgen", sagte Zhang Xiyuan die chinesische Außenministerium offizielle Unterrichtung der Presse über den Besuch von Hu zu Ashgabat. "Diese Art der Zusammenarbeit wird natürlich weiter und bietet Platz zu entwickeln. "

Mit anderen Worten, liegt Chinas Zusammenarbeit mit Zentralasien auf die Konvergenz von gegenseitigem Interesse. Chinesisch Kommentare haben betont, dass "der Export-Diversifizierung" als eine strategische Option hat, wurde für die Länder Zentralasiens notwendig, nachdem die Finanzkrise und die Nachfrage der europäischen Länder für Erdgas in der Region ist zurückgegangen.

Pan Guang, Direktor des Shanghai Center for International Studies, und ein chinesischer Gelehrter, sagt Chinas "riesigen Devisenreserven Erwerb von Kapazitäten und ihrer günstigen geographischen Lage ist sehr attraktiv", um die Gas-Exporteure von Zentralasien. Chinas Energieverbrauch Zusammenarbeit gefördert werden soll auch die Entwicklung der Nicht-Energie-Industrie in der Region, wie chemische, Landwirtschafts-, Verkehrs-Infrastruktur Bau-und Leichtindustrie, nach dem chinesischen Analysten. Russlands Sicherheitsinteressen wäre auch gedient, wie Arbeitslosigkeit, eine Wurzel der Instabilität, soll gesenkt werden, hieß es.

Unter Berücksichtigung all dieser Faktoren zu berücksichtigen, der Schluss gezogen, People's Daily Zeitung, dass die chinesische Pipeline eine Chance für Russland war.

"Einige Leute in Russland betroffen sind und Media-Agenturen haben den Fall übertrieben, öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen, zu behaupten, dass China Russland wichtigsten strategischen Konkurrenten geworden, in der zentralasiatischen Energiewirtschaft wird", sagte der Zeitung. "In der Tat ist es nicht der Fall.

"Experten gehen davon aus, dass die Pipeline Erdgas transportieren können hergestellt ist, sowohl in Turkmenistan und in Russland ... [die] China-Russland-Pipeline transportiert vor allem Erdöl und Erdgas in den östlichen sibirischen Region. Es ist schwierig, von Erdgas in beiden erzeugte Verkehr der westsibirischen Region und den europäischen Teil Russlands, so dass die China-Zentralasien Erdgas-Pipeline wird vielleicht die als "Schlüssel" zur Lösung des Problems.

"Darüber hinaus ist die Erdgas Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und Zentralasien ist offen und nicht-exklusive und nicht ergreifen Markt in Russland oder im Wettbewerb mit Russland um Ressourcen," People's Daily sagte.

Im Wesentlichen ist die chinesische Argument, dass während der turkmenischen-usbekisch-kasachische Pipeline möglicherweise erschliesst den Energie-Optionen in Europa wird es nicht schaden den Interessen Russlands. Das Argument ist stichhaltig. Mit der Inbetriebnahme der turkmenischen Gas-Pipeline gibt es keinen Zweifel daran, dass US-amerikanischen und europäischen Energie-Diplomatie in Zentralasien gerendert wurde ein tödlicher Stoß versetzt.

Durch ein Mega-Projekt, hat Peking, was Moskau wurde das Streben nach mehr als einem Jahrzehnt mit einem fragmentarischen Ansatz. Die Europäische Union die Chancen zu gewinnen turkmenischen Lieferungen für das US-backed-Pipeline-Projekt Nabucco (Verbindung zwischen dem Kaspischen mit Südeuropa) scheinen nun stark vermindert. Moskau kann aufatmen, da das Nabucco-Projekt geplant, Russland Ausschnitt aus der direkten europäischen Erdgas-Handel mit dem Kaspischen Meer.

Deshalb, wenn es eine Null-Summen-Spiel, ist es wie folgt aus: China's zu gewinnen ist Europas Verlust, der kann wiederum Russlands zu gewinnen, da russisches Gas ist nun die auch weiterhin Europas wichtigste Energiequelle für die absehbare Zukunft. Unnötig zu sagen, Europa ist weiterhin Abhängigkeit von russischer Energie stellt eine wichtige Chip für Moskau in seinen Bemühungen, Partnerschaften mit den wichtigsten europäischen Ländern zu knüpfen.

Tatsächlich kann Russland jetzt seine ehrgeizigen Nord Stream und South Stream Gasfernleitungen, um Europa voranzubringen, ohne sich ständig mit Blick über die Schulter für den Wettbewerb von konkurrierenden US-backed transkaspische Pipelines wie Nabucco.

Auch hier könnte die USA und Europa nicht den chinesischen Warnung, dass Peking will ein ernstes Angebot zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt für das russische Gas in den westlichen sibirischen Region sowie ihre europäischen Teil produziert machen verpasst haben (das sind derzeit die wichtigsten Quellen der Versorgungssicherheit für Europa). In der Tat hat sich China als konkurrierende des russischen Gases projiziert.

Alles in allem ist die chinesische Pipeline erheblich stärkt Position in Russland. Das erklärt vermutlich die stille Genugtuung in der Stimme russische Ministerpräsident Vladimir Putin, als er über die Auswirkungen der Turkmenistan-China-Pipeline gebeten.

"Die Inbetriebnahme der Turkmenistan-China-Pipeline geht nicht um unsere Pläne zur Ausweitung unserer eigenen Pipeline-Netz, was möglicherweise auch Auswirkungen auf China zu erreichen", sagte Putin. "Ich beziehe mich auf wachsenden Verbrauch in China von primären Energieressourcen. Wir stehen in regelmäßigem, engem Kontakt mit unseren chinesischen Kollegen zu diesem Thema. Wir wissen, wie schnell sich die Nachfrage größer ist da, und sie sind auch die Situation genau beobachtet. Das Gas Link zu Turkmenistan nicht untergraben wird unsere Pläne. "

Am wichtigsten ist, ist der "Verlust" des turkmenischen Gases für Nabucco, dass das Projekt sich nun kritisch, hängt von Sourcing-iranischen Gas. Mit anderen Worten, Zahlen Iran prominent in jedem ernsthaften europäischen Pläne (stark von den USA unterstützt) an seiner Gasimporte so diversifizieren zu reduzieren die Abhängigkeit von russischen Energielieferungen.

USA zieht in Zentralasien AfPak ...

Um sicher zu sein, 2009 wird von Historikern als ein entscheidendes Jahr für die zentralasiatischen Sicherheit festgestellt werden. Zum ersten Mal in der postsowjetischen Zeit, ein echtes regionales Projekt hat Gestalt in Zentralasien getroffen. Es ist eine neue Erfahrung für eine Region auseinander gerissen durch zahlreiche intra-regionale Spannungen, Irritationen und Missverständnisse - sei es über Wasser-Sharing, Islamisten, die Umwelt oder die "großen Spiel". Dies wurde durch die Anwesenheit des Präsidenten von Turkmenistan, Usbekistan und Kasachstan bei der Zeremonie die Einleitung der turkmenischen Gas-Pipeline-Projekt unterstrichen.

Es kann nicht auf die zentralasiatischen Eliten verloren werden, dass China hat ein so hohes Maß an regionaler Zusammenarbeit möglich gemacht haben. Hu in seiner Rede bei der Preisverleihung zitierte die turkmenischen Pipeline als ein Modell der regionalen Zusammenarbeit. China erntet die Vorteile von etwa 15 Jahren der Patienten, gewissenhafte Diplomatie. Es wird nun eine Herkules-Aufgabe für den Westen zu schüren Sinophobia unter den mittel-Asiaten.

Zur gleichen Zeit ist, vorausgesetzt, China eine enorme Verantwortung in der Region zu keiner Zeit zuvor. Die Gas-Pipeline macht China als "Akteur" in der zentralasiatischen Sicherheit. Die Anleihe geht nun weit über die Bekämpfung der drei Kräfte "Terrorismus, Separatismus und Extremismus", das, wie China seine phänomenal erfolgreiche Diplomatie konzentrierte sich in der Mitte der 1990er Jahre.

In Zukunft wird das kommende Jahr sehen die Vereinigten Staaten zu intensivieren Anstrengungen zur Bekämpfung der Einfluss Chinas in Zentralasien. Die Alarmglocken läuten in Washington. Bei den US Senate Foreign Relations Unterausschuss speziellen Anhörung zu Zentralasien am 15. Dezember, George Krol, der Deputy Assistant Secretary of State für Süd-und Mittelamerika asiatische Angelegenheiten, sagte: "Diese Regierung ist nicht der Auffassung Zentralasien zu einem Rückstau vergessen, periphere von US-Interessen . Die Region ist in der Dreh-und Angelpunkt der wichtigsten US-Sicherheitsbehörden, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen. Er verlangt Aufmerksamkeit und Respekt und unsere fleißigsten Bemühungen und die Obama-Administration [verpflichtet], um diesen Ansatz sehr. " [Hervorhebung hinzugefügt.]

Nie zuvor hat ein US-amerikanischer Beamter erklärte US-Absichten gegenüber post-sowjetischen Zentralasien in diesen starken Worten. Tatsächlich gibt es eine implizite Warnung an Peking, dass die USA gerade ihre Ausflüge in der Region eng zusammen und lassen sie nicht ohne Widerspruch passieren.

Aus vorliegenden Angaben sind die USA versuchen, die gyre seiner AfPak Strategie so ausgeweitet werden, für die zentralasiatische Region hinein zu ziehen. In empirischer Hinsicht einen Fall gibt es bereits für die Aufnahme der Region in den AfPak Strategie. Zum einen ist die nördliche Korridor zur Versorgung der North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Kontingente in Afghanistan und die Beschaffung von Materialien aus der Region für den Wiederaufbau Afghanistans bereits zu den regionalen Regierungen wichtige Mitarbeiter in den Kriegseinsatz.

Die stärkere Präsenz von NATO-Truppen in Afghanistan kann nur dazu führen, dass eine größere Rolle für die Länder Zentralasiens, die verpflichtet ist, sie in eine engere Beziehung zu bringen. Es gibt auch Grund zu der Annahme, dass der Krieg in Afghanistan bereits über verschüttete bis nach Zentralasien. Die genauen Hintergründe dieses bleibt offen für Interpretation, sondern die Tatsache ist, dass es eine Beschleunigung des militanten Aktivitäten in Zentralasien (Xinjiang und ist).

Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol gerahmt es diplomatisch durch betont, dass eine politische Priorität der US-amerikanischen "werden, um die Zusammenarbeit mit den zentralasiatischen Staaten zu unterstützen Koalition Bemühungen Niederlage gegen Extremisten in Afghanistan und Pakistan und sorgen für Stabilität und Wohlstand in der Region weiter ausbauen wird." Dies geht Hand in Hand mit dem Versuch, die "Förderung der Entwicklung und Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung der Region Mittel-und Versorgungswege.

Potenzielle Bedrohungen, die kommen könnten aus Zentralasien, abgesehen von der Möglichkeit der "state failure" würden die USA zwingen, besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Region zu zahlen, sagte Krol. Er aufgerufen archetypische Ängste über Terroristen habhaft zu Massenvernichtungswaffen, die ein nützliches Argument für die Begründung der US-Intervention im Irak und in Afghanistan bewährt hat.

"Während diese [Central Asian] Länder freiwillig aufgegeben, ihre nuklearen Arsenale nach dem Fall der Sowjetunion, heute ist die Region immer noch in Aktivitäten, die für die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen, nämlich Uran-Bergbau tätig, Plutonium-Produktion und die Herstellung und Prüfung der biologischen und chemischen Waffen ", sagt Krol.

In einer Maßnahme der US-Bestimmung, sich in eine führende Rolle in Zentralasien, die Obama-Administration Ort hat die Bildung einer neuen Rahmen der jährlichen hochrangigen bilateralen Dialog mit den Ländern der Region angekündigt.

... als ihm der Optionen

Interessen der USA wäre am besten gedient, wenn Russland und China waren in den Haaren in Zentralasien. Aber das ist offensichtlich nicht so sein, wie die Dinge sind passiert.

Moskau sieht positiv auf Investitionen in China in Zentralasien, nach Stephen Blank der US War College. "Mit der Eröffnung des RFE [russischen Fernen Osten], um chinesische Investitionen und Segen ähnliche Investitionen in Zentralasien, ist Moskau eine Abkehr von ihrer Politik gegenüber sowohl dem Fernen Osten und in Zentralasien", schrieb Blank im August. "In der Tat, diese und ähnliche Angebote Öffnen Sie die Tür zu einer enormen Expansion - mit russischer Zustimmung - der strategischen Profil Chinas in beiden Regionen. Die Schaffung einer neuen regionalen Ordnung in der RFE und Zentralasien nimmt Formen an und China ist zu der Region Sicherheits-Manager, vor allem sicherzustellen, dass sein Portfolio-Investitionen sicher sind und sicher. "

Der Paradigmenwechsel in der traditionellen Politik des Kremls im Hinblick auf die RFE wurde weitgehend durch die Rezession in der russischen Wirtschaft im Gefolge des globalen Wirtschaftskrise und dem starken Rückgang der Öl-Einnahmen notwendig. Moskau war eine Politik zu entwickeln, die RFE-und Ostsibirien fast ausschließlich über Einnahmen aus Energie-Exporte nach Europa. Aber mit der Abschwächung der Energienachfrage in den europäischen Markt und stark reduzierten Einnahmen aus Exporten kann der Kreml nicht nachhaltig die Ausübung einer solchen Politik verfolgte Lösung mehr. Er wurde gezwungen, neu zu überdenken.

Das war im Mai deutlich, wenn der russische Präsident Dmitri Medwedew eingeräumt, dass die Entwicklung der benötigten RFE mit regionalen Strategie in Peking zu verjüngen Nordosten verfallenen China die industrielle Basis abgestimmt werden. Überraschend, dass die russische Politik Wandel impliziert auch die Ablassen von jeglichen Versuch der chinesischen wirtschaftlichen Durchdringung in Zentralasien zu verhindern.

Zweitens steht Moskau Schwierigkeiten bei der Übernahme der Sicherheit und Stabilität in der zentralasiatischen Region auf ihrem eigenen Dampf. Dies gilt trotz direkten Einfluss der Region auf die nationale Sicherheit Russlands Interessen. Zur gleichen Zeit hat Moskau eine Kongruenz der Interessen mit China zuvorzukommen Erweiterung der NATO in die Sicherheit der zentralasiatischen Länder. Das Zusammenspiel dieser Faktoren fordert Moskau zu betrachten günstig die Intensivierung der chinesische Engagement in Zentralasien.

Natürlich Schriften erscheinen in den russischen Medien gelegentlich über die Wirtschaftspolitik Chinas "Eroberung" Zentralasien, aber die offizielle Politik scheint nicht zu einer solchen Perspektive zu fördern. Das neue Denken in Moskau mit Bezug auf die chinesischen Investitionen in RFE und Zentralasien können bereits begonnen haben, zahlen sich aus. Medwedew behauptete während eines Besuchs von Hu in Moskau im Juni, dass Russland und China hatten holte im Wert von 100 Milliarden Dollar von einem "speziellen Mechanismus" Erleichterung massiven chinesischen Investitionen in regionale Projekte. Es wird sehr schwierig für die USA diese Pläne zu stören. Als Blank formulierte: "Für alle, die gerade für den Aufstieg Chinas zu einer beherrschenden wirtschaftlicher und politischer Akteur in Asien sind, haben diese neuen Abkommen mit Russland eine tiefe Bedeutung, die wir übersehen, auf eigene Gefahr."

China hat den großen Vorteil der finanziellen Muskeln. Es kann einfach outspend den USA oder europäischen Ländern. Short zu schüren das Feuer der Militanz und ethnischen Unruhen in Xinjiang, könnten die USA haben von Optionen aus ausführen, um neue Führung in China in Zentralasien zu stören. Auf dem Teil, weiß Peking, dass die Stabilität der Provinz Xinjiang in China für Zentral-Asien-Politik ist von entscheidender Bedeutung - und umgekehrt. Die beiden haben sich untrennbar in der chinesischen regionale Strategie zu tun.

Peking weiß, dass "ausländische Teufel auf der Seidenstraße" - militanten Gruppen mit ausländischen Geldgebern - China durch Sprengung weite Teile der Pipelines, die für Peking nicht praktikabel, in Xinjiang große Berge und Wüsten zu schützen belästigen können. Das ist eine solide Grund, warum Peking wurde nicht in der US-Ouvertüren für die Zusammenarbeit in Afghanistan ist auch nicht per Dauerauftrag Obama Einladung verliebt in Südasien als Schiedsrichter des Friedens und der regionalen Sicherheit Schritt.

Peking ist äußerst misstrauisch, die verborgenen Absichten hinter der afghanischen Strategie Obama vor kurzem vorgestellt. In der Tat, Chinesisch Kritik an der US-Truppen in Afghanistan hat sich in letzter Zeit ganz energisch. Am vergangenen Donnerstag, schrieb die People's Daily:

Ja, manchmal die Geschichte nicht wiederholt ... Der Schatten des Vietnam-Krieges auch jetzt noch schwebt ... was entfaltet, ist die Replikation des Modells im Irak, und weiter zurück, in Vietnam.

Die vom Krieg zerrütteten afghanischen Bevölkerung wird nicht auf die Seite mit den schlummernden Karzai-Regierung noch werden sie begrüßen die US-Präsenz. Auf der anderen Seite, die breitere Standfläche gemacht durch den verstärkten US-Truppen und ihre NATO-Verbündeten nur helfen, Kraftstoff, den Aufständen und Auslöser heftiger Widerstand ... Taliban stirbt hart.

Das Dilemma, vor denen die USA und die ein-jährige Obama ist, dass zu der Zeit, scheint es keine Politik, die das Verderben in Afghanistan umkehren kann, auch mit mehr Truppen und besser platziert Taktik. Aber der junge Präsident wird versuchen, was er kann, zu meiden die Falle, die die Supermacht in eine Besatzungsmacht wiederum würde.

China (und Russland) haben Grund zu der auf der Hut sein, dass Obama's afghanischen Überspannungsschutz und die neue Strategie als Ganzes zielen im Wesentlichen auf der Verfolgung langjährigen strategischen Interessen der USA zu kontrollieren Zentralasien und mit Russland und China durch "sanfte Macht" - die Methoden unterscheiden sich von denen der der früheren US-Regierungen. Klar, hüllte die russisch-chinesische Zusammenarbeit in Zentralasien Faktoren in den USA Spielplan am Hindukusch, das im Dunkeln. Having said that, China finden es auch Anlass zur Sorge, dass Russland in zwei Stimmen zuweilen über ihre Beziehungen mit der NATO im Rahmen der "Reset" der Beziehungen mit den USA sprechen tendiert.

Das Gespenst von einer offenen militärischen Präsenz der USA in der Region verfolgt China. Schließlich war China der USA Komplizen gegen die Sowjetunion in der afghanischen Jihad in den 1980er Jahren und sollte wissen, dass Washington unzähligen Möglichkeiten zu nutzen hat der radikalen und extremistischen Elementen als Instrument der Geopolitik. China kann sich direkt vor seinen Augen die schrecklichen Beispiel finden Sie in der "All-Wetter-Freund" Pakistan, die durch den Umgang mit US-Strategie in Afghanistan wurde in den Strudel der Instabilität geschleppt und zum Ziel von religiösen Extremisten und Kämpfer.

Botschafter MK Bhadrakumar war ein Karriere-Diplomat im Indischen Auswärtigen Dienst ein. Seine Aufgaben waren die Sowjetunion, Südkorea, Sri Lanka, Deutschland, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Usbekistan, Kuwait und der Türkei.

Unregistered
25-12-09, 16:10
Übersetzung von Englisch in RussischLateinische Umschrift anzeigen
Китай сбрасывает условий взаимодействия в Центральной Азии
12/23/2009 | Западные источники

Asia Times
24 декабря 2009
К М К Бхадракумар

Нурсултан Назарбаев способ рисования линий в песок. Президент Республики Казахстан заявил недавно в мировой нефтяной и металлический майоров, что новые законы позволят только те иностранные инвесторы, которые сотрудничают с программой индустриализации коснитесь его минеральными ресурсами страны.

"Мы будем работать только с теми, кто предлагает проекты помогают диверсификации экономики", сказал он на 4 декабря инвестиционной конференции в Астане, столице Казахстана, в котором приняли участие ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC и других инвесторов. Чтобы этого не хотят сотрудничать, он сказал: "Мы будем искать новых партнеров, предложить им благоприятные условия и ресурсы для выполнения проектов".

Для ровного счета, он добавил, что Пекин попросил Казахстан - страна размером с Европу, но только с 16 миллионов человек - чтобы позволить китайским фермерам использовать один миллион гектаров земли казахской возделывать такие культуры, как соя и маслосемян рапса.

Pro-западных элементов в политике с казахского на улицы. 17 декабря, выступая на митинге в г. Алматы, Болат Абилов, сопредседатель оппозиционной партии "Азат [Объединенная социал-демократическая партия] обратил апокалиптический сценарий:" Если мы завтра дать, или распространять одного миллиона гектаров земли, это будет означать, 15 людей, работающих с гектара. Это означает, что 15 миллионов людей будут привезены из Китая. Если одна из этих 15 человек были рожать каждый год, что будет в конце. В 50 лет, не было бы 50 миллионов китайцев [в Казахстан] ".

Акция была проведена за пределами китайского консульства в Алматы с плакатами с надписью "Ху Цзиньтао, мы не откажемся от казахской земле!"

Трубопровод в самое сердце Азии ...

Сообщение Назарбаев был прямым: западные инвесторы могут сохранить свои деньги, если только заинтересованные в использовании недр Казахстан. Президент выступает как важное событие в истории и политике в Центральной Азии было сбросить условий участия иностранцев в регионе: развитие амбициозного 7000 километров трубопровода на ссылку газ в регионе полях городов на восточном побережье Китая.

Через десять дней после Назарбаев говорил, Ху Цзиньтао прибыл на центральноазиатского турне по официальным вводом в эксплуатацию 1833-километрового трубопровода подключением газовых месторождений в Туркменистане, Узбекистане и Казахстан (и, возможно, Россия) Китая Синьцзян-Уйгурском автономном регионе.

Туркменистан утверждает, что только может поставлять 40 миллиардов кубических метров (БСМ) газа в год по нефтепроводу в течение трех десятилетий после его достигает полной мощности. Это составляет примерно половину текущего Китая ежегодного потребления.

Узбекистан подписал соглашение с Китаем в ноябре прошлого года экспортировать до 10 млрд. кубометров газа в год. (2006 положить оценкам запасов газа Узбекистана составляют 1,8 триллиона кубометров.) Ветка туркмено-китай магистральный трубопровод проходит через город Газли, в Бухарской области, где узбекский газ может подаваться в нее. Китай вложил в узбекский газ месторождений в регионе. Узбекские резервы в основном сосредоточены в провинции Кашкадарьинская и близ Бухары наряду с которым китайский трубопровод проходит.

Казахстан намерен экспортировать еще 10 млрд. кубометров газа через другое соединение трубопроводов филиала. Китай, который готовится к массовому увеличению потребления, хочет природного газа составляет 10% в общем объеме производимой энергии к 2020 году, с 3% в 2005 году. Китай потребляется 77,8 млрд. кубометров природного газа в прошлом году, чуть больше, чем его внутреннего производства 77,5 млрд. куб. Тем не менее, страна сталкивается с нехваткой природный газ 70-110 миллиардов кубометров к 2020 году, по данным на 2009 год по развитию энергетики доклад, опубликованный в Китайской академии социальных наук, официальный мозгового центра ". Все импорта Китая в настоящее время газ в виде сжиженного природного газа и его отдельно повышение ее импорта сжиженного природного газа мощностью до 15 млн. до 18 млн. тонн к концу следующего года.

Был широко скептицизм среди наблюдатели ли трубопровода Центральная Азия проект увидит свет. Действительно, Китай толкнул вперед против западных взглядов, новых беспорядков в прошлом году в Синьцзян-положил его под угрозу. "Китай уделяет много яиц в одну корзину, 'один британский эксперт." Ужасно много нефти и газа идет через небольшой регион. Глядя сейчас на тенденции в Синьцзяне, вы могли бы спросить, есть ли путь из Центральной Азии на самом деле более безопасным, чем маршруты через Юго-Восточной Азии или в Южно-Китайском море ".

Намек был очевиден: что Центрально-Азиатская трубопровода в Китае может стать сидят утки для террористов. Как сказал Роберт Эбель, в Центре Стратегических и Международных Исследований в Вашингтоне, положил его безопасности можно было бы невозможным, если трубопроводы становятся мишенью, поскольку они проходят через обширные малонаселенные районы в Центральную Азию и Синьцзян. "Существует никоим образом можно защитить газопровода вдоль всей его длины. Он просто не может быть сделано", Эбель, эксперт по вопросам безопасности, сохранен. Волнения в Синьцзяне, в частности, угрожает Центральной Азии трубопроводов, добавил он. "Я уверен, что это вызывает седые волосы на людях в Пекин", сказал он.

... посылает ударные волны в Вашингтон

Американские специалисты разработали сценарий судного дня для китайского трубопровода. Дать в Центральной Азии, Кавказа Института & Аналитик из университета Джона Хопкинса в октябре прошлого года, Стивен Бланк из Военного колледжа США фирменных Синьцзян как "скороварки", которые Пекин далеко контроля.

Растущая нервозность в Вашингтоне о китайском трубопроводе было довольно ощутимым. Сената США по иностранным делам провел слушания редки в июле в отношении геополитического тяга Китая в Центрально-Азиатском регионе. Дачи показаний в слушаниях, Richard Morningstar, специальный посланник США по энергетике, подчеркнул, что США необходимо разработать стратегию, чтобы конкурировать с Китаем для производства энергии в Центральной Азии.

Возможно, это был первый случай, когда высокопоставленный чиновник США открыто помечен как Китай конкурентом США в области энергетической политики Центральной Азии. Американские эксперты, как правило, сосредоточил внимание на русский доминирования энергетической сцене в регионе и работала для уменьшения русского присутствия в пост-советском пространстве агитации по поддержке Транскаспийского проектах, которые обходят Русский территории. В самом деле, некоторые американские эксперты по региону, даже утверждали, что Китай является потенциальным союзником США по изоляции России.

Конечно, 2009 стал поворотным пунктом в американской дискурсов о политики Китая в Центральной Азии. За туркменский газ в Китае трубопровода ближе к завершению, США начали беспокойства на поверхность.

"Китай оказывает увеличение и сильное влияние в Центральной Азии:" Morningstar сказал. `` Трудно для нас [США], чтобы конкурировать с Китаем в некоторых из этих стран. Это просто для Туркменистана заключить сделку с Китаем, когда Китай поставляется и говорит: "Эй, мы собираемся, чтобы выписать чек на Х количество денег, мы собираемся построить трубопровод '. Это не жесткие дело согласиться, и мы [США] не может конкурировать в этой Way ".

Morningstar выдвинуто два предложения. Один, "разработать стратегию для решения этой [китайские политики] и поощрять американским компаниям вести переговоры с Туркменистаном творческое". Два, Вашингтону следует также думать о том, имеет смысл для американских компаний сотрудничать с Китаем в таких странах.

Возможности для американо-китайского сотрудничества по центрально-азиатских энергетических ресурсов является весьма ограниченным. В геополитическом смысле, возникает конфликт интересов между двумя странами. Одним из главных целей Китай зафиксировать источники энергии, которые не зависят от поставок маршрутов, проходящих через Малаккский пролив, который США и контроля может оказаться камнем преткновения в случае американо-китайского противостояния.

Кроме того, Morningstar себе палец на суть проблемы. Хотя было хорошего на энергоносители в Китае голодных экономике для получения "чистой энергии", таких как природный газ, "газ, который идет в Китай конкурирует с газом, что могло пойти Запад".

Пекин поднимает ставки ...

Однако США понимает, что разработка counterstrategy для Китая это легче сказать, чем сделать. Присутствия Китая в странах Центральной Азии сцены энергии не происходит один день. Кропотливая дипломатии распространение в течение многих лет пошел за ним. Это было в 1997 году, что Казахстан и Китай договорились построить 3000 км нефтепровода и позднее удвоить пропускную способность до 20 млн. тонн в год.

В 2005 году CNPC International выплатила почти $ 4 млрд за 33% акций компании "ПетроКазахстан". В следующем году Китай скупал активы казахстанской нефти на сумму почти $ 2 млрд в нефтяном Karazhanba и газовых месторождений (который имеет доказанные запасы более чем 340 миллионов баррелей), согласился приобрести 30 млрд. кубометров туркменского природного газа ((позднее это увеличение до 40 млрд. кубометров) , и выделили 210 миллионов для поиска нефти и газа в Узбекистане в течение ближайших пяти лет.

В 2008 году Казахстан и Китай договорились о совместной разработке нефтяных и газовых месторождений на континентальном шельфе Каспийского моря, в то время как китайская Guangdong Nuclear Power Co и государственных Казахстан ядерной Фирма "Казатомпром" согласился на повышение добыче урана в их совместном предприятии.

В апреле 2009 года Китай сделал матерью всех энергетических сделок, согласившись оказать Казахстан $ 10 млрд на беспрецедентный "кредит в обмен на нефть" сделки, а также согласился с государственным "КазМунайГаз" совместного купить Мангистаумунайгаз производителем нефти на 3,3 млрд. долл. США.

В 2009 году Китай также согласился выдать 3 миллиарда долларов кредита для развития центрально-азиатского государства крупнейшего газового месторождения Южная Иолотань, которая, по оценкам, содержать где-то между 4 трлн и 14 трлн кубометров газа, в соответствии с Великобританией Gaffney, Cline и юристы - что делает его одним из пяти крупнейших в мире газовых месторождений.

К тому времени, США, проснувшись, Китае, имеющий четкую энергетическую стратегию для стран Центральной Азии, стратегия уже работает. Западные расчеты пошли наперекосяк в двух направлениях. Во-первых, они считали, что, в конечном счете, государства Центральной Азии будут осторожны рассмотрения своего гигантского соседа и предпочитают Россией и Западом. Во-вторых, слепой Предполагается, что России в любом случае должна была воспринимать китайские прибыли в качестве угрозы для своих собственных стратегических интересов и, следовательно, сопротивляться и мат Пекин на определенном этапе, косвенным, выступающая западные интересы.

К разочарованию Запада, не только Центрально-Азиатских государств подогревают до китайского увертюры, но они все купаются в китайской внимания и наслаждается тем труднее сделки они могут нанести удар в переговорах цен и контрактов с западными компаниями.

Опять же, участие Китая в Центральной Азии была всеобъемлющей и не ограничивается только нефтью и газом. Центральной Азии, ищут именно такие материалы из зарубежных стран, как Назарбаев высказал в Астане. Выступая перед китайским СМИ в Ашхабад накануне прибытия Ху Цзиньтао на ввод в эксплуатацию газопровода на 14 декабря президент Туркменистана Гурбангулы Бердымухамедов подчеркнул неоднократно какие отношения его страны с Китаем стали "многогранная".

"Они теперь охватывают все основные сферы - политика, экономика, торговля, культура, наука, образование, 'сказал Бердымухаммедов." И, поэтому, конечно, есть много тем для обсуждения в ходе нашей встречи с президентом Китая. Главное, что все они имеют положительный контекст, очень благоприятным фоном в качестве основы для переговоров, и их стартовые позиции обеих сторон выступает полное взаимопонимание и доверие, равенство и уважение, единство взглядов по ключевым вопросам мировой политики и двусторонние отношения ".

Западные эксперты часто говорят в пренебрежительном тоне, что страны Центральной Азии предпочитают китайские, потому что они никогда не возникают трудные вопросы, такие, как демократия и права человека. Но это слишком упрощенное чтение. Страны Центральной Азии рассматривают западную дискурса по вопросам демократии и прав человека в качестве двусмысленных из стран, которые потворствуют авторитарных режимов, без сомнения, когда это отвечает их интересам бизнеса.

Страны Центральной Азии обратить удовлетворение тем, что в конечном итоге Вашингтон больше не топтал на чувствительность региона и этос. Мода, в которой учили Узбекистан прочный уроком для Европейского Союза и США о взаимном уважении и справедливом отношении широко отмечается в столице региона.

Но это только часть истории. Главное, что Китай сбросить условий взаимодействия Запада с Центральной Азией. Западные страны должны вести переговоры с жесткого Центральной Азии собеседников прямо. Во-вторых, в то время как они находятся под давлением отказаться от вишни выбора подхода они когда-то взял - трогательные драгоценные минералы в регионе и уклоняются от любых дальнейших участие такие как в секторе обрабатывающей промышленности и сельского хозяйства - основные правила применения вооруженной силы, что Назарбаев изложены в форума инвесторов в Астане дать представление о том, что произойдет.

Послужной Китая в Туркменистан выводит новые стандарты для Запада. Китай-Туркменистан торговли прыгнул в 40 раз с 2000 года; 35 предприятий работают сегодня в Туркменистане с участием китайского капитала. Китайские компании принимают активное участие в секторах туркменской экономики же разнообразны, как нефть и газ, телекоммуникации, транспорт, сельское хозяйство, текстильная, химическая и пищевая промышленность, здравоохранение и строительство.

С точки зрения Ашхабада зрения интересов Китая в всеобъемлющее сотрудничество с туркменской политической экономики резкий контраст с хищными инстинктами западных компаний, которые в нуль на горнодобывающей промышленности с маниакальным рвением. Конечно, в этом процессе, Китай также заканчивает с большой долей туркменской энергетики.

... но успокаивает Москву

Второй аспект, следует отметить, что с началом Центральная Азия Китай трубопровод России после советского контроля экспорта газа из Центральной Азии закончилась. Американские комментаторы пытались распространить это в условиях усиления Китая из поворота будет потеря России. Но это не совсем игра с нулевой суммой в этом смысле. Пекин был необычайно откровенными в обсуждении деликатного вопроса о том, Китае заблокирована в конкуренцию с Россией в сфере энергетики в Центральной Азии.

"Китай проводит диверсификацию импорта энергоносителей, в то время как страны Центральной Азии проводят диверсификацию экспорта, сказал Чжан Xiyuan, китайские официальные иностранные брифинг министерства пресса о визите Ху Цзиньтао в Ашхабад." Такого рода сотрудничество естественно, будем продолжать и комнаты развиваться ".

Иными словами, сотрудничество Китая со странами Центральной Азии лежит на сближение взаимных интересов. Китайский комментариях подчеркивается, что "диверсификации экспорта" в качестве стратегического опция стала необходимой для стран Центральной Азии после финансового кризиса, и, поскольку спрос европейских стран на природный газ в регионе снизилось.

Пан Гуан, директор Шанхайского центра международных исследований и видного ученого, говорит: "Китай огромные валютные покупательной способности и выгодного географического положения является чрезвычайно привлекательным" для экспортеров газа из Центральной Азии. Энергетическое сотрудничество Китая также будет способствовать развитию не-энергетических отраслей в регионе, таких, как химическая, сельское хозяйство, строительство транспортной инфраструктуры и легкой промышленности, по мнению китайских аналитиков. Интересы безопасности России, также будут служить, как безработица, причина нестабильности, будут сокращены, сказали они.

С учетом всех факторов в счете, таким образом, ежедневная газета Народно к выводу, что китайский нефтепровод был возможностью для России.

"Некоторые люди в России, заинтересованные учреждения и средства массовой информации преувеличивают события для привлечения внимания общественности, утверждая, что Китай станет основным стратегическим конкурентом России в Центральной Азии энергетики, 'газета." На самом деле, это не тот случай.

"Эксперты считают, что газопровод может транспортировать природный газ, добываемый в Туркменистане, как и в России ... [] Китай-Россия основном трубопровод транспортирует нефть и природный газ, добываемый в Восточной Сибири. Это трудный для транспортировки природного газа, добываемого в обоих Западно-Сибирского региона и Европейской части России, так и Китая в Центральной Азии газопровод, возможно, будет действовать как "ключ" к решению этой проблемы.

"Кроме того, природный газ сотрудничества между Китаем и странами Центральной Азии является открытой и не эксклюзивный, а не захватить рынок России, или конкурировать с Россией за ресурсы" Жэньминь Жибао "сказал.

В сущности, китайская аргументом является то, что в то время туркмено-узбекско-казахского трубопровода делает возможности проникнуть в альтернативных источников энергии Европе это не повредит интересам России. Аргумент является обоснованным. С вводом в эксплуатацию трубопровода туркменского газа, нет никаких сомнений, что американские и европейские энергетической дипломатии в Центральной Азии был вынесен смертельный удар тела.

Через один мега-проект, Пекин, что Москва стремилась на протяжении десятилетия с поэтапным подходом. Шансов Европейского Союза на победу поставок туркменского для поддерживаемого США проекта трубопровода "Набукко" (соединяющий Каспийское с южной Европе) теперь кажутся значительно сократилась. Москва может вздохнуть с облегчением, поскольку проект "Набукко" планирует сократить Россию из прямых торговых газа в Европу с Каспийским.

Поэтому, если есть игра с нулевой суммой, это так: усиление Китая потерю Европой, которая, в свою очередь, можно получить в России, начавшийся русский газ в настоящее время, безусловно, останутся основным источником энергии для Европы в обозримом будущем. Излишне говорить, сохраняющаяся зависимость Европы от Русский энергии является жизненно важным для чипа Москвы в его усилиях по налаживанию партнерских отношений с ведущими европейскими странами.

Более того, Россия теперь может достижения своих амбициозных Северный поток "и" Южный поток "газопроводов в Европу без необходимости постоянно смотреть над плечом для конкуренции с конкурентом поддерживаемого США транскаспийского трубопровода такие, как" Набукко ".

Опять же, США и Европа не могла бы пропустили китайские предупреждения, что Пекин намерен сделать серьезную ставку на некоторое время на русский газ, добываемый в западной Сибири, а также ее европейской части (которая в настоящее время являются основными источниками Поставка для Европы). По сути, Китай наметил себе как конкурирующие потребителя русский газ.

В целом, китайские трубопровода значительно усиливает позиции России. Это, вероятно, объясняет тихой удовлетворенности в голосе русский премьер-министра Владимира Путина, когда он был задан вопрос о последствиях газопровода Туркменистан-Китай газопровода.

"С вводом в эксплуатацию трубопровода Туркменистан-Китай не будет влиять на наши планы по расширению нашей сети трубопроводов, которые могли бы также достичь Китай", сказал Путин. "Я имею в виду растущего потребления в Китае первичных энергетических ресурсов. Мы регулярно поддерживать тесные контакты с нашими китайскими коллегами по этому вопросу. Мы знаем, как быстро растет спрос есть, и они тоже внимательно следят за развитием ситуации. Ссылка газ в Туркменистане не будет подрывать наши планы ".

Самое важное, что "потери" от туркменского газа для "Набукко" означает, что сам проект сейчас очень сильно зависит от Sourcing иранский газ. Иными словами, Иран занимает видное место в любых серьезных европейских планах (решительно поддержал США) для диверсификации своего газового импорта, с тем чтобы сократить зависимость от поставок энергоносителей русский.

США обращает Центральной Азии в AfPak ...

Надо отметить, что 2009 год будет отметить, историками как знаменательный год для стран Центральной Азии безопасности. Впервые в постсоветский период, действительно региональный проект сложился в Центральной Азии. Это новый опыт для региона, раздираемых многочисленных внутри-региональной напряженности, раздражающих и недоразумения - будь то за раздела водных ресурсов, исламисты, окружающей среды или "большой игры". Это было подчеркнуто в присутствии президентов Туркменистана, Узбекистан и Казахстан на церемонии запуска трубопровода на туркменский газ проекта.

Она не может быть потеряно на центрально-азиатские элиты, что Китай добился столь высокого уровня регионального сотрудничества возможное. Ху Цзиньтао в своей речи на церемонии привел туркменского трубопровода в качестве модели регионального сотрудничества. Китай пожинает блага около 15 лет терпеливых, кропотливых дипломатии. Теперь будет сложнейшая задача для Запада, чтобы подстегнуть Sinophobia среди стран Центральной Азии.

В то же время, Китай берет на себя огромную ответственность в регионе, ни разу ранее. Газопровод делает Китай "заинтересованная сторона" в Центрально-Азиатском безопасности. Облигация теперь выходит далеко за рамки борьбы с тремя силами "терроризм, сепаратизм и экстремизм", которое, как Китай сосредоточил свои феноменальные успехи дипломатии в середине 1990-х годов.

Заглядывая вперед, предстоящий год будет видеть, как США активизировать усилия по борьбе с влиянием Китая в Центральной Азии. Колокол тревоги звонит в Вашингтоне. На иностранным делам сената США специальных слушаниях подкомитета по Центральной Азии на 15 декабря Джордж Крол, заместитель помощника государственного секретаря по делам Южной и Центральной Азии, сказал: "Эта администрация не считает Центральную Азию забыли заводи, на периферии интересов США . регионе, по крайней опоры Key безопасности США, экономические и политические интересы. Он требует внимания и уважения, и наши самые настойчивые усилия с администрацией Обамы [совершается] по сей подход ". [Подчеркнуто автором].

Никогда раньше американский чиновник заявил, США намерений в отношении бывших советских республик Центральной Азии в таких сильных слов. Действительно, существует подразумеваемая предупреждения в Пекине, что США смотрят свои вылазки в регионе тесно и не позволит им пройти без проблем.

С настоящего указания, попытка США заключается в расширении круговорота своей стратегии AfPak с тем чтобы привлечь Центрально-Азиатского региона в него. В эмпирическом выражении случае уже существует для включения региона в стратегию AfPak. С одной стороны, Северный коридор для поставки в Организацию Североатлантического договора (НАТО) контингентов в Афганистане и источники материалов из этого региона для восстановления Афганистана уже делают региональные власти важно сотрудников в военных действиях.

Расширение присутствия войск НАТО в Афганистане может привести лишь к более важную роль для стран Центральной Азии, который связан чтобы привести их в более тесные рабочие отношения. Существует также основания полагать, что афганская война уже пролито над Центральной Азией. Точное предысторию этого остается открытым для толкования, но фактом является то, что там был рывок в боевую деятельность в Центральной Азии (и СУАР).

Заместитель помощника госсекретаря Крол оформлена она дипломатически, подчеркнув, что приоритетом политики США будут "по расширению сотрудничества с государствами Центральной Азии для оказания помощи коалицией усилия по борьбе с экстремистами в Афганистане и Пакистане и принести стабильность и процветание в этом регионе". Это идет рука об руку с усилиями по "увеличить развития и диверсификации энергетических ресурсов региона и маршрутов поставок".

Потенциальные угрозы, которые могут поступать из Центральной Азии, помимо возможности "неспособности государства" будет заставить США обратить пристальное внимание на регион, сказал Кроль. Он также сослался архетипических страхов о террористах попадания оружия массового уничтожения, которое оказалось полезным аргументом для обоснования вмешательства США в Ираке и Афганистане.

"Хотя эти [Центральной Азии] страны добровольно отказались от своих ядерных арсеналов после падения Советского Союза, то сегодня в регионе все еще занимаются деятельностью, связанной с распространением оружия массового уничтожения, а именно, добыча урана, производство плутония и изготовления и испытание биологического и химического оружия ", сказал Кроль.

В степень решимости США разместить в самой ведущую роль в Центральной Азии, администрация Обамы объявил конституцию новой рамках ежегодных заседаний высокого уровня двустороннего диалога с каждой из стран региона.

... как он работает из ссылок

Интересы США было бы лучше всего, если Россия и Китай были в натянутых отношениях в Центральной Азии. Но это не похоже, положение вещей происходит.

Москва выглядит благоприятно на инвестиции Китая в Центральной Азии, в соответствии с Стивен Бланк из Военного колледжа США. "Открывая Дальнем Востоке [русский Дальний Восток] на китайские инвестиции и благословения аналогичных инвестиций в Центральной Азии, Москва сводит на нет своей политики в отношении как на Дальнем Востоке и в Центральной Азии, 'Blank писал в августе". В сущности, это и другие аналогичные сделки открыть дверь к значительному увеличению - с согласия Москвы - стратегического профиля Китая в обоих регионах. Создание нового регионального порядка на Дальнем Востоке и в Центральной Азии начинает приобретать форму и Китай также намерен стать менеджером безопасности в регионе, обеспечить свою очередь, что портфельные инвестиции являются надежным и безопасным. "

Сдвиг в традиционной политики Кремля в отношении Дальнего Востока была необходима основном за счет спада в экономике Русский следующий глобальный экономический кризис и резкое падение поступлений от продажи нефти. Москва проводит политику, направленную на развитие Дальнего Востока и Восточной Сибири, почти исключительно за счет доходов от экспорта энергоносителей в Европу. Но с ослаблением спроса на энергоносители на европейском рынке и резкое сокращение доходов от экспорта, в Кремле не могут обеспечить достижение такого упорного вариант политики больше. Она была вынуждена пересмотреть.

Это проявилось в мае, когда русский президент Дмитрий Медведев признал, что развитие Дальнего Востока, необходимо координировать с региональной стратегией Пекине омолаживающим северо-восточной промышленной базы ветхих Китая. Неудивительно, что русский сдвиг политика также предполагает пренебрежение любыми попытками предотвратить китайского экономического проникновения в Центральную Азию.

Во-вторых, город Москва сталкивается с трудностями в андеррайтинга безопасности и стабильности в Центрально-азиатском регионе по своим собственным паром. И это несмотря на непосредственное влияние региона на национальные интересы безопасности России. В то же время Москва сравнения интересов с Китаем в предотвращение расширения НАТО в безопасность в Центральной Азии. Взаимодействие этих факторов призывает Москву считать благоприятным активизация китайского участия в Центральной Азии.

Конечно, писания появляются в средствах массовой информации иногда русский об экономических показателей Китая завоевание "Центральной Азии, однако официальная политика как представляется, не поощрять такую перспективу. Новое мышление в Москве в связи с китайскими инвестициями в РСЕ и Центральной Азии, возможно, уже начали приносить свои плоды. Медведев заявлено в ходе визита Ху Цзиньтао в Москву в июне, что Россия и Китай clinched сделок на сумму 100 миллиардов "специальным механизмом" Содействие массовые китайские инвестиции в региональные проекты. Это будет очень трудным для США, чтобы сорвать эти планы. Как пустые писал: "Для всех тех, кто смотрит на превращение Китая в доминирующую экономическую и политическую роль в Азии, эти новые контракты с Россией имеют большое значение, что мы выходят на свой страх и риск".

Китай обладает огромными преимуществами финансовых мышц. Оно может превзойти США по рентабельности или европейских странах. Кратко о разжигая огонь экстремизма и этнические волнения в Синьцзяне, США могут запустить из вариантов сорвать новые руководства Китая в Центральной Азии. Со своей стороны, Пекин не знает, что стабильность в Синьцзяне имеет решающее значение для Центральной политика Китая в Азии - и наоборот. Два стали неразрывно связаны с китайским региональной стратегии.

Пекин знает, что "иностранные черту на Великом шелковом пути" - боевая группа с зарубежными покровителями - может преследовать Китай, взорвав протяженных трубопроводов, непрактично в Пекин, чтобы защитить в огромной горе Синьцзяна и пустынь. Это одна из причин, почему твердые Пекин не были приняты в увертюры к США по сотрудничеству в Афганистане, ни влюбленные, стоя приглашения Обамы шаг в Южной Азии в качестве арбитра мира и региональной безопасности.

Пекин очень настороженно относятся скрытые намерения, стоящие за афганского стратегия Обамы Недавно открыт. В самом деле, китайская критика всплеск американских войск в Афганистане стала совершенно силового последнее время. В прошлый четверг, People's Daily пишет:

Да, иногда история не повторится ... Тень войны во Вьетнаме до сих пор еще витает ... что сейчас происходит репликация модели в Ираке, и дальше в прошлое, во Вьетнаме.

Войной афганского населения не будет со стороны правительства Карзая дремлющие и не будут приветствовать присутствие США. С другой стороны, большой след выступили расширение американских войск и их союзников по НАТО только способствуют разжиганию беспорядков и вызвать более ожесточенное сопротивление ... Талибан живуч.

Затруднительное положение перед США и годовалый администрации Обамы в том, что в то время, кажется, нет политики, который может обратить вспять Отмена в Афганистане, даже больше военнослужащих и более благоприятном положении тактику. Но молодой президент будет пытаться все возможное, чтобы избегать ловушки, который превратил бы сверхдержавой в оккупационные власти.

Китай (и России) есть основания быть начеку, что афганские Обамы от всплесков напряжения и новая стратегия в целом основной целью, на достижение давние стратегические интересы США в Центральной Азии, контроля и сдерживания России и Китая через "мягкую власть" - методы отличаются от предыдущих администраций США. Очевидно, что русско-китайского сотрудничества в Центральной Азии факторы в плане США игра в горах Гиндукуш, которое окутано тайной. Сказав, что Китай также найдут его тревожит то, что Россия стремится говорить на два голоса порой о своих связях с НАТО в рамках "Reset" отношений с США.

Спектр открытого состава американского военного присутствия в регионе преследует Китая. В конце концов, Китай был сообщником США в отношении Советского Союза в афганском джихаде в 1980-х и должен знать, что Вашингтон имеет множество способов сделать использование радикальных и экстремистских элементов в качестве инструментов геополитики. Китай может видеть прямо перед глазами ужасные примером ее "всепогодным другом" Пакистана, которые, связывая с американской стратегии в Афганистане были втянуты в водоворот нестабильности и стать объектом религиозных экстремистов и боевиков.

После М. К. Бхадракумар была дипломатом в Министерстве иностранных дел Индии. Его Задания включали Советском Союзе, Южной Корее, Шри-Ланки, Германии, Афганистана, Пакистана, Узбекистана, Кувейта и Турции.

Unregistered
25-12-09, 21:14
Uqiringizga kop rehmet. Hekiketen hemme uyghurlar ve orta asiya helkliri okumisa bolmaydigan ishlarken.

Unregistered
26-12-09, 08:40
Bu munberning uyghurlarning munbiri bolishiga munasip uyghurqisi yok kandak gep bu?Silerqe hemme adem engilizqe ve nemisqe rusqe bilemdu?

Unregistered
27-12-09, 18:02
Englischini Uyghurche terjime qilip bering emese.


Bu munberning uyghurlarning munbiri bolishiga munasip uyghurqisi yok kandak gep bu?Silerqe hemme adem engilizqe ve nemisqe rusqe bilemdu?

Unregistered
27-12-09, 18:18
Bu munberning uyghurlarning munbiri bolishiga munasip uyghurqisi yok kandak gep bu?Silerqe hemme adem engilizqe ve nemisqe rusqe bilemdu?

Berip englisqe ugineve ogri.

Unregistered
12-06-11, 11:31
Berip englisqe ugineve ogri.

hey jalapning balisi ingilische digen nime?

Terjiman
12-06-11, 23:44
中国在中亚复位聘用条款
2009年12月23日|西源

亚洲时报
2009年12月24日
由M K表Bhadrakumar

纳扎尔巴耶夫是在沙子上画线的方式。主席的
哈萨克斯坦最近对全球石油和金属巨头新的法律将只允许
那些与他的产业化项目合作,外国投资者把握
他的国家的矿产资源。

“我们将与那些只有谁提出帮助该项目多样化
经济,“他说,在12月4日在阿斯塔纳,哈萨克斯坦投资会议
资本,这是由安赛乐米塔尔,雪佛龙,道达尔,ENRC等出席
投资者。对任何不愿合作,他说:“我们将寻求新的
合作伙伴,为他们提供有利条件和资源来履行的项目。“

从好的方面,他补充说,北京已要求哈萨克斯坦 - 一个国家的大小
但欧洲只有16万人口 - 让中国农民使用一
哈万公顷土地种植大豆和油菜等农作物的种子。

在哈政治亲西方的元素,因为走上街头。论
12月17日,处理了在阿拉木图,努尔加利Abilov,共同主席反弹
反对党Azat [联合社会民主党]吸引了世界末日
场景:“如果我们明天给,或分发,一百万公顷的土地,它
将每公顷平均15人的工作。这意味着将有1500万人
从中国带来的。如果这15人中就有1人每年要生下,即
将结束。在50年中,将有5000万[哈萨克斯坦]中。“

外面举行集会,在阿拉木图的中国领事馆与标语牌写着:“先生
胡锦涛,我们不会放弃哈萨克斯坦的土地!“

向亚洲的心脏管道...

纳扎尔巴耶夫的信息是直接:西方投资者可以继续他们的钱,如果
感兴趣的只是在开发哈萨克斯坦的矿产财富。总统是在
作为一个重大的历史事件和政治来说是中亚
重新在该地区的外国人接触的条件:发展
一个雄心勃勃的七○○○公里管道连接该地区的天然气田向城市的
中国的东部沿海地区。

十天后耶夫发言时,胡锦涛抵达中央亚洲巡回赛的正式
调试的1833公里的管道连接气田
土库曼斯坦,乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦(可能还有俄罗斯)到中国的新疆
自治区。

土库曼斯坦表示,它便可以提供40亿立方米天然气(亿立方米)的年薪
通过三十年管道一旦达到满负荷生产。这是关于
上半年中国目前的年消费量。

乌兹别克斯坦11月签署的协议,与中国去年出口达10
亿立方米天然气一年。 (估计2006年的1.8万亿放在乌兹别克斯坦的天然气储量
立方米。)对土库曼,主干管道中国支线通过的通行证
对Gazli镇,在布哈拉地区,那里的乌兹别克气体可以到它喂食。中国
已投资在该地区的乌兹别克天然气田。乌兹别克斯坦储量
主要集中在Qashqadaryo省和布哈拉附近的一起
中方管道通行证。

哈萨克斯坦是设置为通过另一分支管道出口10亿立方米天然气另一
连接。中国,这是一个消费大量增加的准备,希望
天然气占能源结构的10%,到2020年,从2005年的3%。中国
消耗天然气77.8亿立方米,去年略微超过其国内产量
77.5亿立方米。然而,国家面临的70-110亿立方米的天然气短缺
2020年,根据2009年能源发展报告由中国出版
社会科学院,官方智囊团。总的来说,中国的天然气进口量
目前在液化天然气的形式,分别是其液化天然气进口能力提高
1500万至18万,到明年年底吨。

有观察家普遍持怀疑态度之​​间是否中亚管道
项目将看到曙光。事实上,中国对西方地推进
意见认为,去年在新疆骚乱再次置于危险境地。 “中国是放
一篮子鸡蛋在一个不少,'一位英国专家说。 “一种可怕的大量石油和天然气
即将通过一个小的区域。现在看,在新疆的趋势,你可以问
是否从中亚航线实际上是通过多途径的安全
东南亚或南中国海“。

言外之意很明显:即中国的中亚管道可能会成为
坐在恐怖分子鸭子。正如罗伯特埃贝尔在战略和中心,
在华盛顿的国际研究,把它,安全是不可能的,如果能
管线越目标,因为它们通过传递大片地广人稀
在中亚地区和新疆。 “有没有办法可以保护管道
沿其整个长度。它只是不能做“,玉宝,安全专家,
维持。新疆动乱,特别是威胁中亚管道,
他补充说。 “我敢肯定,这是引起人们对北京的白发,”他说。

...华盛顿发出冲击波

美国专家们得出了中国管道世界末日的场景。
写作中的中亚和高加索地区的约翰霍普金斯研究所分析师
大学在去年十月,美国的Stephen战争学院的空白品牌
新疆作为一个“高压锅”,这是北京远不及控制。

从小在华盛顿的紧张对中国管道是相当明显的。
美国参议院外交关系委员会举行的听证会就七月一罕见
中国的地缘政治推入中亚地区。在作证
听证会上,理查德晨星,美国对能源的特使强调,
美国需要制定战略,与中国争夺中亚能源。

这也许是第一次有美国高级官员公开标记中国
作为美国在中亚能源政治对手。通常有美国专家
集中在该地区的能源优势的关注和俄罗斯现场工作
减少了拉票支持在苏联解体后俄罗斯的存在空间
跨里海绕过俄罗斯境内的项目。事实上,一些美国
对本地区专家甚至认为,中国是一个潜在的美国盟友隔离
俄罗斯。

当然,2009年是美国对中国政策的论述转向点
中亚。作为中国的土库曼斯坦的天然气管道有接近完成,美国不安
开始浮现。

“中国是有在中亚的影响力越来越重,'晨星说。
``这是我们很难[美国]与中国竞争,其中一些国家。它的
容易使土库曼斯坦与中国达成协议,当中国进来说,'嗨,
我们将写一个X的钱的支票,我们将构建一个
管道'。这不是一个难以接受处理的,我们[美国]不能在这个竞争
方式。“

晨星公司提出了两项​​建议。一,“制定一项战略,以对付
该[中国政策]和鼓励美国公司进行谈判创造性地
土库曼斯坦“。二,华盛顿也应该考虑是否是有意义的
美国公司与中国合作,在这些国家。

美中在中国范围中亚能源资源合作是非常有限的。
在地缘政治方面,有一两个国家之间的利益冲突。
中国的主要目标之一是在能源不锁
依赖于供应通过马六甲海峡,而美国传递路线
控制和可以证明一个瓶颈在一个美中国对抗的事件点。

此外,晨星自己放在了他的手指问题的症结所在。虽然
只适合中国的能源饥渴的经济获得“清洁能源”,如自然
气,“天然气是去中国的竞争对手的气体,可以继续向西”。

北京提出了一个赌注...

然而,美国认识到,制定一个counterstrategy到中国的是说起来容易
做起来难。中国在中亚能源舞台的存在是不是一个单一的
一天的发生。经过多年艰苦的外交蔓延了后面。这是
早在1997年,哈萨克斯坦和中国同意建立一个3000公里的原油
管道,后来产能翻番至2000万吨。

2005年,中油国际支付了33%的股份,近40亿美元
哈萨克斯坦石油公司。次年,中国买下了哈萨克斯坦石油资产价值近
20亿美元的Karazhanba石油和天然气田(已探明储量更
超过340亿桶),同意购买30亿立方米的土库曼斯坦天然气((后来
这增加至40亿立方米),并承诺拨出2.1亿的石油和天然气看看
乌兹别克斯坦在未来五年。

2008年,哈萨克斯坦和中国同意就共同开发石油和天然气储备
在里海大陆架,而中国广东核电有限公司
和哈萨克斯坦国家核能公司Kazatomprom同意提高铀产量
在他们的合资企业。

2009年4月,中国作出同意贷款的所有能源交易的母亲
哈萨克斯坦100亿美元的空前的“贷款换​​石油”协议,并同意
国有KazMunaiGas,共同购买的石油生产商MangistauMunaiGas $ 3.3
亿元。

2009年,中国还同意发展中央发出的30亿美元贷款
亚洲国家的最大的气田,南Iolotan,估计包含
之间的任何4万亿和14万亿立方米的天然气,根据
英国的加夫尼,克莱因和联营公司 - 从而使其成为世界上最大的五分之一
天然气储量。

由美国次醒来时,中国中央有一个明确的能源战略
亚洲,该战略已经工作。西歪了两种计算
方向。首先,他们估计,在最终的分析,中亚
各国将与他们的警惕和处理庞大的邻国俄罗斯和喜欢
西。其次,他们盲目地认为,俄罗斯在任何情况下必定会觉察
作为自己的战略利益的威胁与中国的利益将因此
抵制和将死在某个阶段北京,间接西方的利益服务。

对西方失望的是,不仅有中亚国家中加热至
序曲,但他们陶醉在所有的中国的关注和品味
更难的讨价还价,他们能够在谈判罢工和合同价格与
西方公司。

同样,中国在中亚的全面参与,而不是一直局限
石油和天然气。中亚人一直在寻求外国正是这种投入
作为国家耶夫在阿斯塔纳表示。在接受中国媒体在阿什哈巴德
对胡锦涛提出的关于天然气管道投产12月14日抵达前夕,
土库曼斯坦总统别尔德穆哈梅多夫一再强调他如何
国家与中国的关系已成为“多面”。

“他们现在包括所有主要领域 - 政治,经济,贸易,文化,科学,
教育,'别尔德穆哈梅多夫说。 “还有,所以,当然,也有很多话题
期间我们与中国主席会议上讨论。最主要的是
他们都具有积极的背景下,作为基础非常有利的背景
进行谈判,并开始对他们的立场有利于双方共同完成
理解和信任,平等和尊重,意见统一的关键问题
世界政治和双边关系。“

西方专家经常讲一个不屑一顾的语气说,中亚人更喜欢
中文,因为他们从来没有提出诸如民主和人权的困难问题
权利。但是,这是一个非常简单的阅读。中亚国家见
作为西方话语含糊的国家的民主和人权
迎合独裁政权没有顾忌到适合他们的业务时,
利益。

中亚国家,最终得出满意华盛顿已不再
践踏地区的敏感与民族精神。其中乌兹别克斯坦时尚
教课的持久欧洲联盟和美国的有关相互尊重
和公平的关系,在该地区广泛关注的首都。

不过,这只是故事的一部分。最主要的是,中国已复位
西方条款与中亚的参与。西方国家需要
谈判与中亚对话者难以正视。其次,虽然他们是
在强迫之下放弃了樱桃采摘的方法,他们曾经参加过 - 感人
该地区的和珍贵的矿物质回避任何进一步的参与,如
在制造业部门或农业 - 接触地面规则
纳扎尔巴耶夫在说明投资者提供了在阿斯塔纳举行的论坛是一个什么样的预示
来。

中国在土库曼斯​​坦的记录显示对西方的新标准。
中国和土库曼斯坦的贸易自2000年以来已上升40倍; 35家企业正在努力
今天中国在土库曼斯​​坦的首都。中国企业积极参与行业
作为石油和天然气,电信,运输多样化的土库曼经济,
农业,纺织,化工和食品工业,医疗保健和建设。

从阿什哈巴德的角度来看,中国的全面接触与兴趣
土库曼政治经济站和掠夺性的本能对比
认为零疯狂的热情与西部矿业公司。
当然,在这个过程中,中国也最终采取了大份额的土库曼
能源部门。

...但可令莫斯科

第二个方面特别指出的是,随着中国的中亚展开
管道,俄罗斯后苏联从中亚天然气出口的控制已经结束。
美国的评论家们试图在中国传播的增益计算,这
谈到了将俄罗斯的损失。但它并不完全是在这种意义上的零和游戏。
北京一直在不寻常的坦率讨论敏感问题是否
中国与俄罗斯已锁定竞争对中亚的能源。

“中国是能源进口多元化的追求,而中亚
国家正在推行出口多样化,'西苑张说,中
外交部官员介绍了胡锦涛访问阿什哈巴德出版社。 “这样的
自然会继续合作,并发展空间。“

换言之,中国与中亚的合作建立在一个收敛
共同的利益。中国评论强调,“出口多元化”
作为一种战略选择已经成为中亚各国有必要后
金融危机和欧洲国家对这一地区的天然气需求
下降。

潘估盎,上海国际问题研究中心主任和
著名学者说,中国的“巨大的外汇购买能力和
优越的地理位置是非常有吸引力“的天然气出口国的
中亚。中国的能源合作也将促进非公有制经济发展,
该地区的能源行业,如化工,农业,交通运输
基础设施建设,轻工等行业,根据中国
分析师。俄罗斯的安全利益,也将送达,如失业,根
不稳定的,将被削减,他们说。

考虑到所有因素,因此,人民日报结束
该管道是中国对俄罗斯的机会。

“在俄罗斯一些人担心和传媒机构夸大了事件
吸引公众的注意,声称中国将成为俄罗斯的主要
在中亚能源工业的战略竞争对手,'该报说。 “在
事实上,情况并非如此。

“专家认为,管道运输的天然气产能都在
土库曼斯坦和俄罗斯... [该]中国- Russia石油管道运输为主
和天然气生产在东西伯利亚地区。这是很难
天然气运输中,西部地区和俄罗斯西伯利亚的产生
欧洲部分,因此,中国与中亚天然气管道将可能作为
'键'来解决问题。

“此外,中国与中亚之间的天然气合作是开放
和非排他性的,不抓住俄罗斯市场或竞争与俄罗斯
资源,“人民日报说。

从本质上讲,中国的说法是,虽然土库曼,乌兹别克,哈萨克管道
可能使进入欧洲的能源选择侵蚀它不会伤害俄罗斯
利益。其论点是有根据的。随着土库曼斯坦的天然气投产
管道,这是毫无疑问,美国和欧洲在中亚的能源外交
已变得致命的身体打击。

通过使用一个大项目,北京有什么莫斯科一直争取在一个
十年,零打碎敲的做法。土库曼赢得欧洲联盟的机会
其美国支持的纳布科管道项目物资(连接里海与
南欧),现在看来严重削弱。莫斯科可以举了一口气,
作为纳布科项目计划削减俄罗斯对欧洲天然气贸易进行直接与
里海。

因此,如果有一个零和游戏,它是这样的:中国的增益是欧洲
损失,这反过来又可以是俄罗斯,因为俄罗斯天然气增益现在肯定会继续
欧洲在可预见的未来的主要能源来源。不用说,欧洲的
继续依赖于俄罗斯的能源构成了重要的芯片在其莫斯科
努力加强与欧洲主要国家的伙伴关系。

事实上,俄罗斯现在可以推进其雄心勃勃的北溪和南溪天然气
有没有不断地回过头来,它的肩膀管道向欧洲
竞争的对手美国支持的跨里海管道,如纳布科。

同样,美国和欧洲可能不会错过的中文警示,北京
打算对产于俄罗斯天然气在一段时间内的严重出价
西西伯利亚地区以及欧洲的一部分(这在目前是
欧洲的主要来源)的供应。实际上,中国已经预计它本身作为一个
竞争的俄罗斯天然气消费国。

总之,大大加强了中国管道俄罗斯的立场。这
可能是在安静的满意解释俄罗斯总理弗拉基米尔普京
当有人问他的声音对土库曼斯坦,中国气体的影响
管道。

他说:“土库曼斯坦,中国管道投产不会影响我们
我们计划扩大自己的管道网络,这有可能也达到中国,'
普京说。 “我指的是中国的一次能源消费增长
资源。我们经常保持与我们的中国同事密切联系本
的问题。我们知道如何快速的需求正在增长,而且他们也正在密切
监察有关情况。链接到土库曼斯坦的天然气将不会削弱我们的
计划。“

最重要的是,“损失”土库曼天然气的纳布科项目本身意味着
现在严重依赖于采购伊朗天然气。换言之,伊朗的数字
突出表现在任何严重的(美国强烈支持)欧洲计划多样化
它的天然气进口,以减少对俄罗斯能源供应的依赖。

美国吸引到AfPak中亚...

可以肯定的是,2009年将是引起了历史学家作为中亚里程碑意义的一年
安全性。对于在后苏联时期第一次,一个真正的区域项目
已在中亚的形状。这是一个四分五裂的地区全新的体验
众多区域内的紧张局势,刺激和误解 - 无论是在
水共享,伊斯兰教徒,环境或“伟大的游戏”。强调了这一点
由土库曼斯坦,乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦两国总统在出席
启动仪式土库曼斯坦的天然气管道项目。

它不能失去了对中亚精英认为中国取得了如此高的水平
区域合作成为可能。他在仪式上讲话胡锦涛引用
土库曼管道作为区域合作的典范。中国正在收获的利益
对病人约15年,艰苦的外交努力。它现在是一个艰巨的任务
对于西方掀起亚洲人之间的中央恐惧症。

与此同时,中国是假设于该地区的一个重大责任
以前没有时间。中国的天然气管道,使中亚的一个“利益相关者”
安全性。该债券现在远远超出打击“恐怖主义三股势力,
分裂主义和极端主义“,这是多么惊人的成功的中国聚焦
外交在90年代中期。

展望未来,未来一年将看到美国加紧努力,遏制中国的
在中亚的影响力。报警的钟声敲响在华盛顿举行。在美国
参议院外交关系小组委员会特别听证会上对中亚十二月
15,乔治克罗尔,副助理国务卿为南美洲和中美洲
,亚洲事务说:“这个政府不考虑中亚
被遗忘的穷乡僻壤,外设到美国的利益。该地区是在支点
美国主要的安全,经济和政治利益。它要求重视和
尊敬和最勤奋的努力和奥巴马政府[致力于]
这个非常做法。“[着重补充。]

以前从未有过一位美国官员表示对美国的意图后苏联
在这种强烈的中亚话。事实上,有一个隐含的警告北京
美国是看其先遣部队进入该地区的紧密合作,并不会让他们
通过没有挑战。

从目前迹象显示,美国的企图是为了扩大其AfPak战略回转
以吸引到它的中亚地区。在实证的角度来看,情况已经
存在,包括在AfPak战略地区。一方面,北
走廊的北大西洋公约组织(北约)特遣队供应
阿富汗和材料采购从阿富汗重建地区
地区政府已经做出努力,在战争中的重要合作者。

增加在北约部队在阿富汗的存在,只能导致更大的作用
中央,则势必使他们成为一个亚洲国家更紧密的工作
关系。还有理由相信,阿富汗战争已经波及
到中亚地区。确切的背景,这仍然是开放的解释
但事实是,出现了在中亚军事活动高潮
(新疆)。

副助理国务卿克罗尔诬陷它强调,一个由外交
美国的政策重点将是“扩大与中亚合作
各国协助联盟的努力,击败极端分子在阿富汗和巴基斯坦
并带来稳定和繁荣的地区。“这正好在手与手
为了“增加的发展和本地区的能源多样化
资源和供应线“。

潜在的威胁可能来自中亚,除了可能性
“国家失败”将迫使美国密切关注该地区,克罗尔
说。他还援引有关原型担心恐怖分子获得持有的武器
大规模破坏,这已被证明为一个有用的论据充实美国
介入伊拉克和阿富汗。

“虽然这些[中亚]国家自愿放弃其核
库后的苏联,该地区仍是在今天秋天进行
相关活动的大规模杀伤性,即武器的扩散,
铀矿开采,钚生产和制造和生物试验
和化学武器,“克罗尔说。

在美国的决心来放置在中亚地区发挥主导作用本身,
奥巴马政府已经宣布了一个新的宪法框架
年度高级别双边对话与该地区的每个国家。

...因为它运行的选项

美国的利益将是最好的服务,如果发生争执,俄罗斯和中国在
中亚。但是,这并不似乎是这样的事情正在发生。

莫斯科看起来看好中国在中亚的投资,根据斯蒂芬
美国的战争学院的空白。 “通过开放的RFE [俄罗斯远东]中文
在中亚,莫斯科投资和祝福类似的投资正在扭转
无论是对远东和中亚地区的政策,'空白写在八月。 “在
实际上,这和其他类似协议打开了一个巨大的扩张门 - 与
莫斯科的同意 - 对中国在这两个地区的战略轮廓。要建立一个
在新的RFE和中亚地区秩序开始形成和中国
将成为该地区的安全管理,确保其首要
证券投资是安全的。“

在克里姆林宫的传统政策方面的转变是的RFE
必要通过在俄罗斯经济低迷之后,全球主要
经济危机和石油收入锐减。莫斯科正在推行的政策
旨在通过对财政收入的RFE开发东西伯利亚和几乎完全
从能源出口到欧洲。但随着能源需求放缓
欧洲市场,出口收入锐减,克里姆林宫不能维持
这种顽强追求的政策选择了。它被迫
重新思考。

这是五月显而易见的,当俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫承认,
注册消防工程师所需要的协调发展与北京的区域战略
中国振兴东北的破旧的工业基地。不出所料,
俄罗斯政策的转变也意味着抛弃任何企图阻止中国
中亚经济渗透。

其次,莫斯科面临的困难,承销的安全与稳定的
中亚地区自身的蒸汽。尽管这是该地区的直接影响
对俄罗斯的国家安全利益。与此同时,莫斯科有一个同余
在防范北约东扩利益与中国进入中亚的
安全性。这些因素的相互鼓励莫斯科有利的方面
加强在中亚中国的参与。

当然,著作出现在俄罗斯媒体偶尔关于中国的经济
“征服”中亚,但官方的政策似乎并不鼓励这种
观点。在莫斯科的新思维关于中国投资的RFE
和中亚可能已经开始见效。梅德韦杰夫在一次访问中声称
胡锦涛在六月至莫斯科说,俄罗斯和中国已夺得超过1,000亿元的交易
由一个“特殊的机制”促进区域大规模的中国投资
项目。这将是非常困难的美国破坏这些计划。随着
空白说的那样:“对于所有那些谁是对中国崛起视为看
主导亚洲的经济和政治的球员,与俄罗斯有这些新的交易
深刻的意义,我们在我们的危险忽视。“

中国拥有巨大的财力优势。它可以简单地outspend美国或
欧洲国家。短的战斗性和煽动种族骚乱的大火
新疆,美国可能已用完的选择扰乱了中国的崛起中的领导
在中亚地区。在它的一部分,北京都知道,新疆的稳定
关键的中国的中亚政策 - 反之亦然。两人已成为
有着千丝万缕的联系,在中国的区域战略。

北京知道“丝绸之路上的洋鬼子” - 与国外的武装组织
支持者 - 可以通过炸毁骚扰的很长一段管道是中国
北京不切实际的做法,保护新疆的广大山区和沙漠。这
一个坚实的理由是北京为什么没有被美国所采取的姿态在
在阿富汗的合作也不是迷恋奥巴马的长期邀请步骤
作为进入南亚地区的和平与安全的仲裁者。

北京是非常谨慎的背后隐藏的意图奥巴马的阿富汗战略
最近亮相。事实上,中国批评美国在阿富汗增兵
近来已成为相当有力。上周四,人民日报说:

是的,有时候历史会重演...对越南战争的阴影,甚至现在还
徘徊...什么是复制在伊拉克展开的模型,并进一步背,
越南。

受战争蹂躏的阿富汗人民不会一边与沉睡的卡尔扎伊政府
他们也不会欢迎美国的存在。另一方面,取得更大的足迹
通过加强美军及其北约盟国不仅有利于叛乱和燃料
引发更多的激烈抵抗...塔利班死亡努力。

面对美国的困境和一岁的奥巴马政府的是,在
当时,似乎没有政策可以扭转阿富汗撤消,甚至
与更多的军队和得到更好放在战术。但年轻的总统,都会尽力
不管他能避开的陷阱,将转成清晰的超级大国
一个占领国。

中国(和俄罗斯)有理由警惕,奥巴马的阿富汗新的激增,
本质上作为一个整体在追求长期战略目标,美国的战略利益
控制中亚和遏制通过“软实力”俄罗斯和中国 -
方法从美国历届政府有所不同。显然,
俄中合作,在美国游戏计划在中亚factors
兴都库什,这是笼罩在神秘之中。话虽如此,中国也将找到它
令人担心的是俄罗斯的发言,有时往往在两种声音的联系,与有关
北约在“重置”与美国的关系。

一个不限成员名额的美国在该地区军事存在的幽灵困扰着中国。后
所有,中国是在阿富汗圣战美国的反对苏联共犯
20世纪80年代,应该知道,华盛顿已经无数办法,使激进的使用
由于地缘政治工具和极端分子。中国可以看到在眼前
它的眼睛它的“全天候朋友”巴基斯坦,以可怕的例子
与美国在阿富汗的战略交往已拖入旋涡
不稳定,成为宗教极端分子和激进分子的目标。

作者MK Bhadrakumar大使是在印度外交部出任外交官。他
任务包括苏联,韩国,斯里兰卡,德国,
阿富汗,巴基斯坦,乌兹别克斯坦,科威特和土耳其。

millet
12-06-11, 23:53
Paydilinish matiriyali:
http://www.eastturkistan.net/turkce/haberler/

Aptomatik terjime:
Çin Orta Asya'da çalıştırma koşullarını sıfırlıyor
(Batı Türkistan'ın alçak hükümetlerini av köpekleri yapar ve onları kullanarak Doğu Türkistan ve batı Türkistan halkını köle etmeyi planlıyor)
http://www.eastturkistan.net/turkce/haberler/11062011/73/%E2%80%9Csizi-av-kopegim-yapacagim%E2%80%9D-diyor-cin.html

2009/12/23 | Batılı Kaynaklar

Asia Times
24 Aralık 2009
M K Bhadrakumar By

Nursultan Nazarbayev kuma çizgiler çizerek bir yol var. Başkan
Kazakistan son zamanlarda yeni yasalar izin vermeyeceğini küresel petrol ve metal binbaşı söyledim sadece
onun sanayileşme programı ile işbirliği bu yabancı yatırımcılar musluğa
onun milletin mineral kaynakları.

"Biz çeşitlendirilmesi yardım projelerine teklif edenler sadece çalışacak
ekonomi, "diye Astana, Kazak bir 4 Aralık yatırım toplantısında söyledi
ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC ve diğer katıldı sermaye,
yatırımcılar. Herhangi bir işbirliğine isteksiz için, şöyle dedi: "Biz yeni arayacaktır
ortaklar, onlara uygun koşulları ve kaynakları projeleri yerine getirmek için sunuyoruz. "

iyi ölçmek için, o Pekin Kazakistan istedi sözlerine ekledi - Bir ülkenin büyüklüğü
Avrupa ama sadece 16 milyon kişi ile - Çinli çiftçiler birini kullanmak için izin
Kazak arazi milyon hektar soya ve kolza tohumu gibi bitkileri yetiştirmek için.

Kazak politikada Batı yanlısı unsurlar beri sokaklara dökülmüştü. Üzerinde
Almatı, Bolat Abilov, The eş başkanı bir miting adresleme 17 Aralık
muhalefet partisi Azat [Amerika Birleşik Sosyal Demokrat Parti] bir kıyamet çekti
senaryo: "Eğer biz yarın vermek veya dağıtmak, kara bir milyon hektar, bu
Hektar başına çalışan 15 kişi anlamına gelir. Bu 15 milyon kişi olacak demektir
Çin getirdi. Bu 15 kişiden biri, her yıl doğum yapması olsaydı o
sonu olur. 50 yıl içinde, [Kazakistan] 50 milyon Çinli olmazdı. "

Çin afişlerin okuma ile Almatı konsolosluk dışında bir ralli "Bay yapıldı
Hu Jintao, biz Kazak arazi vazgeçmeyeceğim! "

Asya'nın kalbine bir boru hattı ...

Nazarbayev mesajı doğrudan oldu: Batı yatırımcılar paralarını halinde saklayabilirsiniz
sadece Kazakistan'ın maden zenginliğini istismar ilgileniyorum. Başkanı oldu
oldu tarihinin en mühim bir olay ve siyaset Orta Asya gibi konuşma
bölgedeki yabancılar için angajman şartları sıfırlanması: gelişimi
iddialı bir 7000 kilometrelik boru hattıyla ilgili şehirlere bölgenin gaz sahalarının bağlantı
Çin'in doğu sahilinde.

Nazarbayev konuştu on gün sonra, Hu resmi bir Orta Asya turuna geldi
gaz alanları birbirine bağlayan 1833 kilometrelik boru hattının devreye alınması
Türkmenistan, Özbekistan ve Kazakistan (ve muhtemelen Rusya) Çin'in Sincan için
Özerk Bölgesi.

Türkmenistan yalnız bir yıl gazın 40 milyar metreküp (bcm) temin edebilir diyor
üç yıl için boru hattı üzerinden tam kapasite ulaştıktan sonra. Bu konuda bir
yarım Çin'in cari yıllık tüketimi.

Özbekistan 10 kadar ihracat geçen yılın Kasım ayında Çin ile bir anlaşma imzaladı
bcm gaz bir yıl. (A 2006 tahmini 1.8 trilyon az Özbekistan'ın gaz rezervleri koymak
metreküp.) Türkmen-Çin gövde boru hattının bir kolu çizgi geçer
Gazlı kasabası, Özbek gaz içine beslenen olabilir Buhara bölgesinde. Çin
Bölgedeki Özbek gaz alanlarında yatırım yaptı. Özbek rezervleri
öncelikle Qashqadaryo il ve Buhara yakınlarındaki konsantre hangi yanında
Çin boru hattı geçiyor.

Kazakistan başka bir şube hattı üzerinden başka bir 10 milyar metreküp gaz ihraç ayarlanır
bağlantı. tüketiminde büyük bir artış için hazırlanıyor Çin, istiyor
Doğalgaz% 3 2005 yılında, 2020 yılına kadar enerji karışımı% 10 hesaba. Çin
biraz kendi iç çıktı fazla, geçen yıl doğal gaz 77.8 bcm tüketilen
77.5 milyar metreküp olan. Ancak, millet tarafından 70-110 milyar metreküp doğal gaz sıkıntısı yüzleri
2020, Çin tarafından yayınlanan 2009 Enerji Gelişme Raporu'na göre
Sosyal Bilimler, resmi bir think-tank Akademisi. Tüm Çin'in gaz ithalatı ve
LNG formunda şu anda ve ayrı ayrı kendi LNG ithalat kapasitesini yükseltiyor
gelecek yılın sonuna kadar 15.000.000-18.000.000 ton.

yaygın şüphecilik olup Orta Asya boru hattı gözlemciler arasında yoktu
Proje gün ışığında görmek istiyorsunuz. Nitekim, Çin Batı karşı ileri itti
kez Sincan'da geçen yıl yenilenen huzursuzluk riski koydum. "Çin koyuyor
bir sepet yumurta çok, 'bir İngiliz uzman "dedi. petrol ve doğal gaz "Bir çok şey
küçük bir bölgenin içinden geliyor. sormak, Sincan eğilimleri şu anda olabilir mi arıyorsunuz
Orta Asya'dan gelen bir rota aslında daha hatlar üzerinden daha güvenli olup olmadığını
Güneydoğu Asya ve Güney Çin Denizi. "

Ima belliydi: Çin'in Orta Asya boru hattının olabileceğini
Teröristler için kolay hedef. ve Stratejik Merkezi'nde Robert Ebel, gibi
Washington'daki Uluslararası Çalışmalar, koyun, güvenlik, eğer imkansız olabilir
onlar büyük uzanıyor yoluyla seyrek nüfuslu geçerken boru hatları hedef haline
Orta Asya ve Sincan'daki alanları. "Bir boru hattı koruyabilir bir yolu yoktur
tüm uzunluğu boyunca. Sadece "yapılamaz, Ebel, bir güvenlik uzmanı,
sürdürdü. Sincan'da Huzursuzluk, özellikle, Orta Asya boru hattı tehdit
diye ekledi. "Ben, Pekin'de insanlar üzerinde gri tüyler neden eminim," dedi.

... Washington şok dalgaları gönderir

Amerikan uzmanlar Çin boru hattı için bir kıyamet senaryosu çizdik.
Johns Hopkins Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Enstitüsü Analist Yazma
Üniversite Ekim ayında geçen yıl, ABD Harp Okulu Stephen Blank markalı
Pekin kontrol yakın yerde bir "düdüklü tencere" olarak Xinjiang.

Çin boru hattı konusunda Washington'da büyüyen sinirlilik oldukça hissedilir oldu.
ABD Senatosu Dış İlişkiler Komitesi ile ilgili Temmuz ayında, nadir görülen duruşma
Orta Asya bölgesine Çin'in jeopolitik itme. AT tanıklık
işitme, Richard Morningstar, enerji için ABD özel temsilcisi, bu altı çizili
ABD Orta Asya'daki enerji için Çin ile rekabet edebilmek için stratejiler geliştirmek gerekiyordu.

Bu üst düzey bir ABD'li yetkili açıkça Çin bandıralı olduğunu ilk defa belki oldu
Orta Asya enerji politikasında ABD'nin rakip olarak. ABD'li uzmanlar, genellikle var
bölgenin enerji sahnenin Rus hâkimiyeti dikkat duruldu ve çalıştı
için destek reklâm tarafından post-Sovyet uzay Rus varlığı azalan
Rus topraklarını baypas Trans-Hazar projeler. Gerçekte, bazı Amerikan
bölgeye uzmanlar bile izole etmek için Çin potansiyel bir ABD müttefiki olduğunu savundu
Rusya.

Kesinlikle, 2009 Çin politikaları Amerikan söylemlerin bir dönüm noktası oldu
Orta Asya'da. Çin'in Türkmen doğalgaz boru hattının tamamlanmasıyla, ABD huzursuzluk ile yakınlaşması olarak
yüzey başladı.

"Çin Orta Asya'da artan ve ağır etkisi yapıyor, 'Morningstar dedi.
bize [ABD] bu ülkelerin bazılarında Çin ile rekabet etmek için `` Bu çok zor. It's
Çin geldiğinde ve 'Hey, diyor Türkmenistan Çin ile bir anlaşma yapmak için, kolay
biz para X miktarı için bir çek yazmak için gidiyoruz, biz inşa gidiyoruz bir
boru hattı '. Kabul etmek zor bir şey değil, ve biz [ABD] bu rekabet edemez
yol. "

Morningstar ileri iki öneri koydu. Biri "ile başa çıkmak için bir strateji geliştirmek
[Çin politikası] ve ABD şirketleri yaratıcı ile müzakere etmeye teşvik olduğunu
Bunun için mantıklı olup olmadığını Türkmenistan ". İki, Washington da düşünmek gerekir
ABD şirketleri bu ülkelerde Çin ile işbirliği yapmak.

ABD-Çin için Kapsam Orta Asya enerji kaynakları üzerinde işbirliği çok sınırlıdır.
Jeopolitik açıdan, iki ülke arasında çıkar çatışması vardır.
Çin biri temel amacı bu değildir enerji kaynaklarına kilitlemek için
Malacca Boğazları, ABD geçerek ikmal yollarının bağlı
kontrol ve bir ABD-Çin yüzleşme durumunda tıkanma noktası olabilecek.

Yanı sıra, Morningstar kendini sorunun çözümü zor mesele üzerine parmağını koydu. bunu yaparken
Çin'in enerji aç ekonomisi için "temiz enerji" almak gibi doğal iyiydi
gaz, "Çin gider gaz batıya gidip gaz ile rekabet".

Beijing bahisler yükseltir ...

Ancak, ABD dedi Çin'in bir counterstrategy oluşturulması daha kolay olduğunun farkına varır
daha yapılır. Orta Asya enerji sahnesinde Çin'in varlığı tek değildi
gün oluyor. yılda özenli diplomasi yayıldı arkasında gitti. Öyleydi
geri 1997 yılında Kazakistan ve Çin 3.000 km ham petrol inşa kabul ettiği
boru hattı ve daha sonra 20 milyon ton yıllık kapasite çift olur.

2005 yılında, CNPC Uluslararası% 33 hissesi için yaklaşık 4000000000 $ ödenmiş
PetroKazakhstan. Çin Kazak petrol varlıkları satın Ertesi yıl yaklasik
2000000000 $ Karazhanba petrol ve gaz alanları (bunların rezervlerinin kanıtlamıştır daha
340 milyon varil fazla), ((daha sonra Türkmenistan'dan 30 milyar metreküp gaz satın almak için anlaşma
,) 40 milyar metreküp, bu artış ve petrol ve doğal gaz aramak için 210.000.000 $ taahhüt
önümüzdeki beş yıl içinde Özbekistan.

2008 yılında, Kazakistan ve Çin ortak petrol ve gaz rezervlerinin geliştirilmesi konusunda anlaştılar
Hazar Denizi'nin kıta sahanlığı, Çin'in Guangdong Nükleer Enerji İşbirliği süre
ve Kazakistan devlet nükleer firma Kazatomprom uranyum çıktı artırılması konusunda anlaştılar
ortak girişim.

2009 yılı Nisan ayında, Çin ödünç kabul ederek tüm enerji anlaşması anne yaptı
Kazakistan $ 10000000000 benzeri görülmemiş bir "borç-for-oil" anlaşma ve de kabul etti
devlet KazMunaiGas ortaklaşa 3,3 $ için petrol üreticisi MangistauMunaiGas satın almak
milyar.

2009 yılında, Çin de Orta geliştirilmesi için 3 milyar dolar kredi sorunu kabul etti
içerdiği tahmin ediliyor Asya devletinin en büyük gaz sahası, Güney Iolotan,
göre gaz yere 4 trilyon ile 14 trilyon metreküp,
İngiltere'nin Gaffney, Cline and Associates - bu dünyanın beş biri haline getiriyor büyük
gaz yatakları.

Zamanla ABD Merkez için net bir enerji stratejisine sahip Çin uyandı
Asya, strateji zaten çalışıyordu. Batı hesaplamaları iki ters gitti
yönleri. Birincisi, tahmin, o nihai analizde, Orta Asya
devletlerin kendi dev komşusu ile ilgili dikkatli olacak ve Rusya ve tercih
Batısında. Ikincisi, körü körüne Rusya her durumda bağlı olduğunu algıladıkları kabul
kendi stratejik çıkarları için bir tehdit olarak Çin kazançlar ve bu nedenle olacak
direnmeye ve dolaylı olarak Batı çıkarlarına hizmet, belli bir aşamada Pekin mat.

Sadece Orta Asya devletleri Çince ısıttı yok Batı'nın dehşet için,
açılımların, ama hepsi Çin dikkat keyfini ve Relishing the
sert pazarlık onlar ile fiyatlar ve sözleşmelerin müzakere grev edebiliyoruz
Batılı şirketler.

Yine, Orta Asya Çin'in nişan ve kapsamlı olmuştur sınırlı değil
petrol ve gaz için. Orta Asyalıların yabancı itibaren tam böyle girdi arayan edilmiştir
Nazarbayev gibi ülkelerde Astana dile getirdi. Çinli medya Aşkabat'ta konuşan
14 Aralık tarihinde doğal gaz boru hattının işletmeye alınması için Hu gelişi arifesinde,
Türkmenistan Cumhurbaşkanı Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov defalarca vurgulanmış nasıl onun
Çin ile ülkenin ilişkilerinin "çok yönlü" haline gelmiştir.

Siyaset, ekonomi, ticaret, kültür, bilim - "Onlar, şimdi tüm önemli alanları kapsayacak
eğitim, 'Berdymukhamedov dedi. "Ve bu yüzden, tabii ki, konu bir yeri vardır
Çin Devlet Başkanı ile görüşmede tartışma için. Ana şey
hepsi olumlu bir bağlam, temel olarak çok uygun altyapıya sahip olduğunu
müzakereler için ve her iki tarafta da başlangıç ​​pozisyonuna karşılıklı tam iyilik
anlayış ve güven, eşitlik ve saygı, görüş birliği önemli konularda
dünya siyaseti ve ikili ilişkiler. "

Orta Asyalılar tercih Batılı uzmanlar genellikle hafife tonda konuşmak
Çin asla demokrasi ve insan gibi zor konular yükseltmek çünkü
hakları. Ama bu okuma çok çok basit bir yaklaşım. Orta Asya ülkeleri bakın
ülkeler, gelen Doublespeak olarak demokrasi ve insan hakları konusunda Batı söyleminin
onların iş elbisesi zaman Scruples olmadan otoriter rejimlere pander
çıkarlar.

Orta Asya ülkeleri sonunda Washington artık olduğu memnuniyeti çizmek
bölgenin hassasiyetleri ve felsefesiyle trampling. Moda Özbekistan
karşılıklı saygı ile ilgili Avrupa Birliği ve ABD için kalıcı bir ders öğretti
ve adil bir ilişki yaygın bölgenin başkentlerinde gözlendi.

Ama bu hikayenin sadece bir parçası. Ana şey Çin sıfırlamak olduğunu ve
Orta Asya ile Batı'nın nişan açısından. Batı ülkelerinde gerek
kare Orta Asya muhataplarına sert anlaşıyorlar. Ikincisi, onlar ise
zorlama altında bir kez aldı kiraz toplama yaklaşımı terk etmek - dokunma
Bölgenin değerli mineraller ve daha fazla katılımı gibi uzak shying
angajman temel kuralları olduğunu - imalat sektöründe ya da tarımda
Nazarbayev ne olduğunu önceden tatma vermek Astana'da yatırımcıların forumda dile
gelmek.

Türkmenistan Çin'in sicili batı için yeni standartlar görüntüler.
Çin-Türkmenistan ticaret 2000 yılından bu yana 40 kat arttı; 35 işletmeler çalışıyoruz
Çin'in başkenti olan Türkmenistan bugün. Çinli firmaların sektörde faaliyet gösteriyoruz
petrol ve gaz, telekomünikasyon, ulaşım gibi çeşitli Türkmen ekonomisinin,
tarım, tekstil, kimya ve gıda sanayi, sağlık ve inşaat.

bakış Aşkabat perspektifinden bakıldığında, kapsamlı nişan Çin'in faiz
Türkmen ekonomi politik yırtıcı içgüdüleri ile kontrast duruyor
çılgın coşkusu ile mineral sanayi sıfır Batılı şirketler.
Kesinlikle bu süreç içinde, Çin de kadar Türkmenlerin büyük bir pay alarak biter
Enerji sektöründe.

... ancak Moskova güvence

dikkat edilecek ikinci yönü olduğu Çin'in Orta Asya başlamasından ile
Boru hattı, Orta Asya'dan gaz ihracatı Rusya'nın Sovyet sonrası kontrol sona erdi.
Amerikalı yorumcu Çin'in kazanç açısından bu yayılmasına çalıştılar
dışarı dönüm Rusya'nın kaybı olması. Ama bu anlamda oldukça sıfır toplamlı oyun değil.
Beijing olup olmadığı hassas bir konu tartışırken olağanüstü samimi oldu
Çin Orta Asya enerji konusunda Rusya ile rekabet içine kilitli.

"Çin, enerji ithalatı çeşitlendirilmesi izlemektedir Orta Asya süre
ülkelerde ihracatın çeşitlendirilmesi peşinde olan, 'Zhang Xiyuan, Çin dedi
dışişleri bakanlığı yetkilisi brifing Aşkabat için Hu'nun ziyareti basın. "Bu tür
işbirliğinin doğal olarak devam edecek ve geliştirmek için oda var. "

Bir başka deyişle, Orta Asya ile Çin'in işbirliği yakınsama dayanmaktadır
karşılıklı çıkarlar. Çince yorumlar ki "ihracat çeşitlendirme" vurguladı var
stratejik bir seçenek olduğu gibi sonra Orta Asya ülkeleri için gerekli oldu
finansal kriz ve bölgenin doğal gaz için Avrupa ülkelerinin talebi olarak sahip
azalmıştır.

Pan Guang, Uluslararası Çalışmalar ve bir için Şanghay Merkezi direktörü
ünlü bilim adamı, Çin'in "büyük döviz alım kapasitesi ve diyor
avantajlı coğrafi konumu son derece "doğal gaz ihracatçıları için çekici
Orta Asya'da. Çin'in enerji işbirliği de sigara geliştirilmesini teşvik edecek-
kimya, tarım, ulaşım gibi bölgedeki enerji endüstrileri
göre altyapı inşaat ve hafif sanayi, Çin
Analistler. Rusya'nın güvenlik çıkarlarına da, işsizlik gibi bir kök hizmet olacağını
istikrarsızlık, kesilmiş olur, dediler.

dikkate alarak tüm faktörler, bu nedenle, People's Daily gazetesi sonucuna
o Çin boru hattı Rusya için bir fırsat oldu.

"Rusya'da Bazı insanlar ve söz konusu medya kuruluşları olayı abartılı var
Çin olacağını ileri sürerek, kamuoyunun dikkatini çekmek için Rusya'nın önemli
Orta Asya enerji sektöründe stratejik rakip, 'gazete söyledi. "In
Aslında, bu durum böyle değil.

"Uzmanlar boru hattı taşımacılığı inanıyorum doğal gaz hem de üretilen
Türkmenistan ve Rusya ... [The] Çin-Rusya hattı ağırlıklı olarak petrol taşımacılığı
ve doğal gaz doğu Sibirya bölgesinde üretilmektedir. O zor
hem Batı Sibirya bölgesi ve Rusya'nın üretilen taşıma doğal gaz
Avrupa yakasında, Çin-Orta Asya doğal gaz boru hattı belki bir görevi görecek kadar
'Anahtar' sorununu için.

"Buna ek olarak, Çin ve Orta Asya arasında doğal gaz işbirliği açık
ve münhasır olmayan, ve Rusya pazarı ele almaz ya da Rusya ile rekabet
kaynaklar, "People's Daily söyledi.

Aslında, Çin argüman olduğu Türkmen-Özbek-Kazak boru hattı ise
muhtemelen zarar vermez Avrupa'nın enerji seçeneklerinin doğru yayılmakta yapar Rusya'nın
çıkarlar. Argüman da kuruldu. Türkmen gazının devreye alınması ile
boru hattı, hiç şüphe yok ki, ABD ve Orta Asya'daki Avrupa enerji diplomasisi
öldürücü bir darbe vücut hale olmuştur.

bir mega proje sayesinde, Pekin Moskova bir aşkın çabası oldu ne var
yavaş yavaş yaklaşımla on yıl. Türkmen kazanan Avrupa Birliği şansını
onun ABD destekli Nabucco boru hattı projesi için malzemeler (ile Hazar bağlantı
Güney Avrupa) artık ciddi azalmış görünüyor. Moskova, rahat bir nefes çekmek için
Nabucco projesi ile Avrupa'nın doğrudan gaz ticaretinin Rusya kesip planlandığı gibi
Hazar.

Bu nedenle, bir sıfır toplamlı oyun varsa, bu gibi: Çin'in kazancı Avrupa'nın
sırayla Rus gaz beri Rusya'nın kazanç olabilir kaybı, şimdi kalması kesindir
öngörülebilir gelecekte Avrupa'nın ana enerji kaynağı. Gereksiz Avrupa'nın, söylemek
Rus enerjisine bağımlılığı devam Moskova için hayati bir çip teşkil onun
çabaları büyük Avrupa ülkeleri ile ortaklıklar kurma.

Nitekim, Rusya şimdi iddialı Kuzey Akım ve Güney Akımı doğalgaz ilerletebilir
sürekli onun için omuz üzerinden bakmak zorunda kalmadan Avrupa'ya boru hatları
Nabucco gibi rakip ABD destekli Trans-Hazar boru hattı rekabeti.

Yine, ABD ve Avrupa Çin uyarı cevapsız olamazdı Pekin ki
üretilen Rus gazı için biraz zaman ciddi bir teklif yapmak niyetinde olan
Bu altındadır batı Sibirya bölgesinde yanı sıra Avrupa yakasında (
Avrupa için tedarik başlıca kaynakları). Sonuç olarak, Çin gibi kendini tahmin var
Rus gaz tüketici yarışıyor.

Sonuç olarak, Çin boru hattı büyük ölçüde Rusya'nın tutumunu güçlendiriyor. Bu
muhtemelen sakin memnuniyetini açıklayan Rusya Başbakanı Vladimir Putin'in
o Türkmenistan-Çin doğal gaz etkileri hakkında istendi sesli zaman
boru hattı.

"Türkmenistan-Çin boru hattının devreye etkisine gitmiyor bizim
planları ', muhtemelen de Çin ulaşabilir kendi boru hattı ağı genişletmek için
Putin dedi. "Ben birincil enerji Çin'in artan tüketim bahsediyorum
kaynaklar. Bu bizim Çinli meslektaşları ile düzenli, yakın temas halinde
sorun. Biz talep büyüyor kadar hızlı olduğunu biliyor, onlar da birbirleriyle yakından
durum izleme. Türkmenistan gaz bağlantı zarar olmaz bizim
planlıyor. "

En önemlisi, Nabucco için Türkmen gazının "kayıp" anlamına geldiğini projenin kendisi
Şimdi kritik İran gaz kaynak bağlıdır. Başka bir deyişle, İran rakamlar
belirgin ciddi bir Avrupa planları (kuvvetle ABD tarafından desteklenen) in çeşitlendirmek
doğal gaz ihtiyacının böylece Rus enerji kaynaklarına bağımlılığını azaltmak için.

ABD AfPak içine Orta Asya berabere ...

emin olmak için, 2009 Orta Asya için bir dönüm yılı olarak tarihçiler tarafından belirtilecektir
güvenlik. Sovyet sonrası dönemde ilk defa, gerçek bir bölgesel proje için
Orta Asya'da şekil almıştır. Onu parça parça yırtılmış bir bölge için yeni bir deneyim
Birçok bölge içi gerginlikler, tahriş edici ve yanlış anlamaları ile - üzerinde olması
su paylaşımı, İslamcılar, çevreye ya da "büyük oyun". Bu vurguladı
de Türkmenistan, Özbekistan ve Kazakistan cumhurbaşkanları varlığı ile
Tören Türkmen doğalgaz boru hattı projesi başlatıyoruz.

Bu Çin gibi yüksek düzeyde yapmış olduğu Orta Asya seçkinler üzerinde kayıp olamaz
bölgesel işbirliği mümkün. Törende yaptığı konuşmada Hu atıf
bölgesel işbirliği modeli olarak Türkmen boru hattı. Çin parası hasat olduğunu
diplomasi özenli hastanın yaklaşık 15 yıl olan. Şimdi bir Herkül görev olacaktır
Batı, Orta Asyalılar arasında Sinophobia körüklemek için.

Aynı zamanda, Çin gibi bölgede çok büyük bir sorumluluk üstlenmektedir
Daha önce hiçbir zaman. Doğal gaz boru hattı Çin Orta Asya bir "paydaş" yapan
güvenlik. Bağ, şimdi çok terörizm "üç kuvveti mücadele ötesinde
bölücülük ve aşırılık ", ne kadar Çin'in Olağanüstü başarılı odaklı
1990'ların ortalarında diplomasi.

İleriye baktığımızda, önümüzdeki yıl ABD Çin'in karşı çabalarını yoğunlaştırmaya göreceksiniz
Orta Asya'da etkiler. Alarm çanları Washington'da çınlıyor. ABD At
Aralık'ta Orta Asya Senato Dış İlişkiler Alt Komitesi özel işitme
15, George Krol, Güney ve Orta sorumlu devlet Müsteşar Yardımcısı
Asian işleri, şunları söyledi: "Bu yönetim Orta Asya dikkate almaz bir
ABD çıkarları için periferik, durgun unutuldu. Bölgenin dayanak noktası olan yer almaktadır
ABD için önemli güvenlik, ekonomik ve siyasi çıkarları. Bu ilgi ve talepler
saygı ve en gayretli çalışmaları ve Obama yönetiminin [kararlıdır]
Bu çok yaklaşım. "[Vurgu ekledi.]

Daha önce hiç karşı ABD'nin niyetleri belirtilen bir Amerikalı yetkili olan post-Sovyet
Böyle güçlü bir deyişle Orta Asya. Nitekim, Pekin'e bir zımni uyarı var
ABD ve yakın bölgeye kendi baskınlarınızda izliyor onlara izin vermeyeceğim
sorun olmadan geçer.

Mevcut göstergeler itibaren ABD girişimi kendi AfPak stratejisinin gyre genişletmek için
böylece içine Orta Asya bölgesinde çizmek için. ampirik açıdan, bir olgu zaten
AfPak stratejisinin bölge dahil bulunmaktadır. bir şey, Kuzey için
Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) birliklerinin temini için Koridor
Afganistan ve Afgan yeniden inşası için bölgeye gelen malzemelerin kaynak
zaten bölgesel hükümetler savaş çabalarına önemli ortak olun.

Afganistan'daki NATO birliklerinin artan varlığı yalnızca daha büyük bir rol yol açabilir
daha yakın bir çalışma içine getirmek için bağlı olduğu Orta Asya ülkeleri için
ilişki. Afgan savaşının sahip olduğuna inanmak için nedenimiz de var zaten döküldü
Orta Asya üzerinde. Bunun tam arka plan yoruma açık kalır
ama aslında Orta Asya'da militan faaliyetlerin bir hamle var olduğudur
(Ve Sincan).

Müsteşar Yardımcısı Krol bir altını çizen tarafından diplomatik olarak çerçevelenmiş
ABD'nin politika önceliği Orta Asya ile işbirliğini genişletmek "olacak
devletleri Afganistan ve Pakistan aşırılık yenmek için koalisyon çabalarına yardımcı olmak için
ve bölge "istikrar ve refah getirmek. Bu elele gider
"Gelişimini artırmak için çaba ve bölgenin enerji çeşitlendirme
kaynakları ve ikmal yollarının ".

olasılığı dışında Orta Asya'dan gelebilir Potansiyel tehditleri
"Devlet başarısızlığı" ABD'nin bölgede, Krol yakın ilgi için zorlamak olur
dedi. O da silahlarının elde tutmak teröristler hakkında arketipik korkular çağrılır
ABD kanıtlayıcı için yararlı bir argüman olduğunu kanıtlamıştır kitle imha
Irak ve Afganistan'daki müdahalesi.

"Bu [Orta Asya] ülkelerin gönüllü olarak feragat ederken kendi nükleer
Sovyetler Birliği, bölgede hala uğraşan bugün yıkılmasından sonra cephaneliklerini
faaliyetleri yani kitle imha silahlarının yayılması ile ilgili,
uranyum madenciliği, plütonyum üretim ve imalat ve biyolojik test
ve kimyasal silahlar, "Krol dedi.

ABD'nin kararlılığının bir tedbir olarak, Orta Asya'da bir başrol kendini yere
Obama yönetiminin yeni bir çerçeve anayasası duyurdu
bölge ülkelerinin her birinin yıllık üst düzey ikili diyalog.

... Bu seçenekler tükenirse olarak

Rusya ve Çin olsaydı ABD çıkarlarına en iyi şekilde kavgalı hizmet olurdu
Orta Asya'da. Ama o şeyler yaşanıyor eskisi gibi görünmüyor.

Moskova Stephen göre, Orta Asya'da Çin'in yatırımlarına olumlu bakıyor
CUMHUR Boş Harp ABD. "Çin için RFE [Rusya Uzak Doğu] açarak
Moskova, Orta Asya'daki yatırım ve nimet benzer yatırımların geri olduğunu
hem Uzak Doğu ve Orta Asya yönelik politikaları, 'Boş Ağustos ayında yazdı. "In
etkisi, bu ve buna benzer fırsatlar çok büyük bir genişleme için açık kapı - ile
Moskova rızasına - her iki bölgede Çin'in stratejik tercihin. Bir oluşturulması
RFE ve Orta Asya'da yeni bölgesel düzenin şekli ve Çin almaya başlıyor
başta sağlanması, bölgenin güvenlik yöneticisi olmaya hazırlanıyor onun
portföy yatırımları güvenli "dedi.

RFE ile ilgili Kremlin'in geleneksel politikasında değişim olmuştur
Aşağıdaki Rus ekonomisinin krizden büyük ölçüde zorunlu küresel
ekonomik kriz ve petrol gelirlerindeki keskin düşüş. Moskova bir politika izlediği
gelirleri üzerinden neredeyse sadece RFE ve doğu Sibirya geliştirilmesine yönelik
Avrupa'ya enerji ihracatından. Ama içinde gevşeme enerji talebi ile
ihracat piyasası ve Avrupa keskin azalma gelir, Kremlin sürdürmek olamaz
Artık böyle bir dogged politika seçeneği peşinde. Buna mecbur oldu
yeniden düşünmek.

Bu Rusya Devlet Başkanı Dmitry Medvedev itiraf zaman Mayıs ayında belli oldu ki
gerekli RFE gelişimi Pekin'in bölgesel strateji ile koordineli olarak
Çin'in harap sanayi üssü kuzeydoğu gençleştirici. Şaşırtıcı, The
Rus politika değişikliği de engellemek için herhangi bir girişiminin jettisoning ima Çince
Orta Asya'da ekonomik penetrasyonu.

Ikincisi, Moskova güvenlik underwriting zorluk ve istikrarın yüzleri
kendi buhar Orta Asya bölgesi. Bu bölgenin direkt etkisine rağmen bir
Rusya'nın ulusal güvenlik çıkarları. Aynı zamanda, Moskova'da bir ahenk vardır
içine NATO'nun genişlemesi forestalling Çin ile çıkarlarının Orta Asya
güvenlik. Bu faktörlerin etkileşimi Moskova olumlu konusunda teşvik
Orta Asya'da Çin katılımı artırıyor.

Tabii ki, yazıları Çin'in ekonomik hakkında zaman zaman Rus medyası görünür
Orta Asya "fetih", ama resmi politika görünmüyor böyle bir teşvik
perspektif. RFE Çin yatırımları ile ilgili Moskova'da yeni düşünce
ve Orta Asya zaten ödemek için başlamış olabilir. Medvedev ziyareti sırasında iddia
Rusya ve Çin olduğu Haziran ayında Moskova'ya Hu tarafından 100.000.000.000 $ değerinde fırsatlar perçinleyen
bölgesel büyük Çin yatırımları kolaylaştırıcı "özel bir mekanizma" tarafından
projeler. ABD'nin bu planları bozmak için çok zor olacak. Gibi
Boş koy: "kim bir olarak Çin ortaya çıkması için izliyor tüm bu
Asya'da hakim ekonomik ve siyasi oyuncu, Rusya ile bu yeni fırsatlar var bir
bizim zararına bakmaktadır o derin anlam. "

Çin mali kas büyük bir avantaja sahiptir. Bu sadece ABD ve outspend olabilir
Avrupa ülkeleri. in militanlığı ve etnik huzursuzluk yangınlar stoking Kısa
Xinjiang, ABD'nin Çin'in gelişmekte olan liderlik bozmaya seçenekleri bitmiş olabilir
Orta Asya'da. kendi bölümünde, Pekin Sincan istikrarı olduğunu biliyor
ve tersi - Çin'in Orta Asya politikası için çok önemli. İki haline gelmiştir
ayrılmaz Çin bölgesel stratejisi arasında bağlantı kurdu.

yabancı ile militan gruplar - Pekin bu "İpek Yolu üzerinde yabancı şeytanlar" bilir
destekçileri - olan boru hatlarının uzun uzanıyor kadar esen Çin rahatsız edebilir
Pekin için pratik Sincan engin dağları ve çöllerde korumak için. O
neden Pekin için ABD açılımların tarafından alınmamıştır bir katı nedeni
Afganistan'da işbirliği ne de bir adım Obama'nın ayakta davetiye ile aşık olduğu
Güney Asya içine barış ve bölgesel güvenlik hakem olarak.

Beijing son derece gizli niyetlerini Afgan stratejisinin Obama'nın arkasında dikkatli olduğunu
geçenlerde açıkladı. Aslında, Afganistan'daki ABD askerlerinin dalgalanma Çin eleştiri
Son zamanlarda oldukça güçlü hale gelmiştir. Geçen Perşembe, People's Daily şunu yazdı:

Evet, bazen geçmişi tekrarlamaya yok ... hala bugün bile Vietnam Savaşı gölgesi
Hovers ... ne, ileri geri, Irak'taki model çoğaltıldığını izlerken
Vietnam.

Savaştan zarar gören Afgan halkının Uyuyan Karzai hükümeti ile yan olmayacak
ne de ABD varlığının ağırlayacak. Öte yandan, büyük ayak izi yaptı
gelişmiş ABD askerleri ve NATO müttefikleri sadece ve ayaklanma yakıt yardımı
daha şiddetli direniş tetik ... Taliban zor ölür.

ABD ve bir yaşındaki Obama yönetiminin karşılaştığı çıkmaz bir de o
zaman, Afganistan'daki felâket ters hiçbir politikası var görünse
daha fazla asker ve daha iyi yerleştirilmiş taktik ile. Ama genç başkan çalışacağız
ne o içine süper açacak çukur sakınmak için olabilir
işgalci bir güç.

Çin (ve Rusya) bekçi olmak için sebepleri var ki Obama'nın Afgan dalgalanma ve yeni
uzun süredir devam eden ABD'nin stratejik çıkarları peşinde de aslında bir bütün amaç olarak strateji
Orta Asya kontrol ve "yumuşak güç" yoluyla Rusya ve Çin içeren -
yöntemleri önceki ABD yönetimlerinin farklı. Açıkça,
In ABD'de oyun planı Orta Asya'da faktörler Rus-Çin işbirliği
olan Hindukuş, sırrına kefen. Sahip, Çin de bulacaksınız söyledi
endişe verici Rusya ile ilişkileri hakkında zamanlarda iki ses konuşma eğiliminde olduğunu
ABD ile ilişkilerin "reset" içinde NATO.

Bölgede haunts Çin'de açık uçlu bir Amerikan askeri varlığının hayaleti. Sonra
tüm, Çin, Afgan cihad Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı ABD'nin suç ortağı oldu
1980 ve Washington radikal yararlanmak için sayısız yollar olduğunu bilmeli
jeopolitik aracı olarak ve aşırılık yanlısı unsurlar. Çin sağ ön görebilirsiniz
onun "her hava arkadaşım" Pakistan ile onun gözü korkunç örneği
Afganistan'daki ABD stratejisi ile ilişkilendirerek girdabının içine sürükledi oldu
istikrarsızlık ve aşırı dinciler ve militanların hedefi haline.

Büyükelçi MK Bhadrakumar Hindistan Dışişleri Hizmet kariyer diplomat oldu. Onun
atamaları, Sovyetler Birliği, Güney Kore, Sri Lanka, Almanya dahil
Afganistan, Pakistan, Özbekistan, Kuveyt ve Türkiye.
[QUOTE=Unregistered;75508]Towendiki hewerni Uyghur tiligha terjime kilip beridighanlar barmu ? Bu makalini tezdin ottura asiyadiki heliklerge yetkuzsek , hitayning axu rayonlarni elip ketixining aldini alghili bolar idi . Hemde biz Uyghur helkige kaysi rayonlarning muhim rayonlikini we nedin ix baxlisak bizge muhimlikini bilgili bolidu .

China resets terms of engagement in Central Asia
12/23/2009 | Western Sources

Asia Times
Dec 24, 2009
By M K Bhadrakumar

Nursultan Nazarbayev has a way of drawing lines in the sand. The president of Kazakhstan recently told global oil and metal majors that new laws would allow only those foreign investors that cooperate with his industrialization program to tap his nation's mineral resources.

"We will work only with those who propose projects helping diversification of the economy," he said at a December 4 investment conference in Astana, the Kazakh capital, which was attended by ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC and other investors. To any unwilling to collaborate, he said: "We will look for new partners, offer them favorable conditions and resources to fulfill projects."

For good measure, he added that Beijing has asked Kazakhstan - a country the size of Europe but with just 16 million people - to allow Chinese farmers to use one million hectares of Kazakh land to cultivate crops such as soya and rape seed.

Pro-Western elements in Kazakh politics have since taken to the streets. On December 17, addressing a rally in Almaty, Bolat Abilov, co-chairman of the opposition party Azat [United Social Democratic Party] drew an apocalyptic scenario: "If we tomorrow give, or distribute, one million hectares of land, it would mean 15 people working per hectare. That means 15 million people would be brought from China. If one of those 15 people were to give birth each year, that would be the end. In 50 years, there would be 50 million Chinese [in Kazakhstan]."

A rally was held outside the Chinese consulate in Almaty with placards reading, "Mr Hu Jintao, we will not give up Kazakh land!"

A pipeline to the heart of Asia ...

Nazarbayev's message was direct: Western investors could keep their money if interested only in exploiting Kazakhstan's mineral wealth. The president was speaking as a momentous event in the history and politics of Central Asia was resetting the terms of engagement for foreigners in the region: the development of an ambitious 7,000 kilometer pipeline to link the region's gas fields to cities on China's eastern seaboard.

Ten days after Nazarbayev spoke, Hu arrived on a Central Asian tour for the formal commissioning of the 1,833-kilometer pipeline connecting gas fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (and possibly Russia) to China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Turkmenistan says it alone can supply 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year through the pipeline for three decades once it reaches full capacity. That is about half China's current annual consumption.

Uzbekistan signed an agreement with China in November last year to export up to 10 bcm gas a year. (A 2006 estimate put Uzbekistan's gas reserves at 1.8 trillion cubic meters.) A branch line of the Turkmen-China trunk pipeline passes through the town of Gazli, in the Bukhara region, where the Uzbek gas can be fed into it. China has invested in the Uzbek gas fields in the region. The Uzbek reserves are primarily concentrated in the Qashqadaryo province and near Bukhara alongside which the Chinese pipeline passes.

Kazakhstan is set to export another 10 bcm gas through another branch pipeline connection. China, which is preparing for a massive increase in consumption, wants natural gas to account for 10% of its energy mix by 2020, from 3% in 2005. China consumed 77.8 bcm of natural gas last year, a little more than its domestic output of 77.5 bcm. However, the nation faces a natural gas shortage of 70-110 bcm by 2020, according to the 2009 Energy Development Report published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, an official think-tank. All China's gas imports are currently in the form of LNG and it is separately raising its LNG import capacity to 15 million to 18 million tons by the end of next year.

There was widespread skepticism among observers whether the Central Asia pipeline project would see the light of day. Indeed, China pushed ahead against Western views that last year's renewed unrest in Xinjiang put it at risk. "China is putting a lot of eggs in one basket,' one British expert said. "An awful lot of oil and gas is coming through a small region. Looking now at trends in Xinjiang, you could ask whether a route from Central Asia is actually more secure than routes through Southeast Asia or the South China Sea."

The implication was obvious: that China's Central Asian pipeline could become a sitting duck for terrorists. As Robert Ebel, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it, security could be impossible if the pipelines become targets as they pass through vast stretches of sparsely populated areas in Central Asia and Xinjiang. "There is no way you can protect a pipeline along its entire length. It just can't be done", Ebel, a security expert, maintained. Unrest in Xinjiang, particularly, threatens the Central Asian pipeline, he added. "I'm sure it's causing grey hairs on the people in Beijing," he said.

... sends shock waves to Washington

The American experts have drawn a doomsday scenario for the Chinese pipeline. Writing in the Central Asia & Caucasus Institute Analyst of Johns Hopkins University in October last year, Stephen Blank of the US War College branded Xinjiang as a "pressure cooker" which Beijing is nowhere near controlling.

Growing nervousness in Washington about the Chinese pipeline was quite palpable. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a rare hearing in July regarding China's geopolitical thrust into the Central Asian region. Testifying at the hearing, Richard Morningstar, the US special envoy for energy, underlined that the US needed to develop strategies to compete with China for energy in Central Asia.

This was perhaps the first time that a senior US official has openly flagged China as the US's rival in the energy politics of Central Asia. US experts usually have focused attention on Russian dominance of the region's energy scene and worked for diminishing the Russian presence in the post-Soviet space by canvassing support for Trans-Caspian projects that bypassed Russian territory. In fact, some American experts on the region even argued that China was a potential US ally for isolating Russia.

Certainly, 2009 was a turning point in American discourses on Chinese policies in Central Asia. As China's Turkmen gas pipeline got closer to completion, US disquiet began to surface.

"China is having increasing and heavy influence in Central Asia,' Morningstar said. ``It is hard for us [the US] to compete with China in some of these countries. It's easy for Turkmenistan to make a deal with China when China comes in and says, 'Hey, we're going to write a check for X amount of money, we're going to build a pipeline'. That's not a hard deal to accept, and we [US] can't compete in that way."

Morningstar put forward two suggestions. One, "to develop a strategy to deal with that [Chinese policy] and encourage the US companies to negotiate creatively with Turkmenistan". Two, Washington should also think about whether it makes sense for US companies to cooperate with China in such countries.

Scope for US-China cooperation over Central Asian energy resources is very limited. In geopolitical terms, there is a conflict of interest between the two countries. One principal objective of China is to lock in energy sources that are not dependent on supply routes passing through the Malacca Straits, which the US controls and could prove a choke point in the event of a US-China confrontation.

Besides, Morningstar himself put his finger on the crux of the problem. While it was good for China's energy-hungry economy to get "clean energy" such as natural gas, the "gas that goes to China competes with gas that could go westward".

Beijing raises the stakes ...

However, the US realizes that devising a counterstrategy to China's is easier said than done. China's presence in the Central Asian energy scene was not a single day's happening. Painstaking diplomacy spread over years went behind it. It was back in 1997 that Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a 3,000 km crude oil pipeline and would later double capacity to 20 million tonnes a year.

In 2005, CNPC International paid almost $4 billion for a 33% stake in PetroKazakhstan. The following year China bought up Kazakh oil assets worth nearly $2 billion in the Karazhanba oil and gas fields (which has proven reserves of more than 340 million barrels), agreed to purchase 30 bcm gas from Turkmenistan ((later increasing this to 40 bcm), and committed $210 million to look for oil and gas in Uzbekistan over the next five years.

In 2008, Kazakhstan and China agreed on jointly developing oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea, while China's Guangdong Nuclear Power Co and Kazakhstan's state nuclear firm Kazatomprom agreed on boosting uranium output in their joint venture.

In April 2009, China made the mother of all energy deals by agreeing to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion in an unprecedented "loan-for-oil" deal and also agreed with state-owned KazMunaiGas to jointly buy oil producer MangistauMunaiGas for $3.3 billion.

In 2009, China also agreed to issue a $3 billion loan for developing the Central Asian state's largest gas field, South Iolotan, which is estimated to contain anywhere between 4 trillion and 14 trillion cubic meters of gas, according to Britain's Gaffney, Cline and Associates - making it one of the world's five largest gas deposits.

By the time the US woke up to China having a clear energy strategy for Central Asia, the strategy was already working. Western calculations went awry in two directions. First, they estimated that, in the ultimate analysis, Central Asian states would be wary of dealing with their giant neighbor and prefer Russia and the West. Second, they blindly assumed that Russia in any case was bound to perceive the Chinese gains as a threat to its own strategic interests and would therefore resist and checkmate Beijing at some stage, indirectly serving Western interests.

To the dismay of the West, not only have the Central Asian states warmed to Chinese overtures, but they are basking in all the Chinese attention and relishing the harder bargains they are able to strike in negotiating prices and contracts with Western companies.

Again, China's engagement in Central Asia has been comprehensive and not confined to oil and gas. Central Asians have been seeking precisely such input from foreign countries as Nazarbayev voiced in Astana. Speaking to Chinese media in Ashgabat on the eve of Hu's arrival for the commissioning of the gas pipeline on December 14, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov highlighted repeatedly how his country's relations with China have become "multi-faceted".

"They now cover all major areas - politics, economy, trade, culture, science, education,' Berdymukhamedov said. "And, so, of course, there are a lot of topics for discussion during our meeting with the president of China. The main thing is that they all have a positive context, the very favorable background as the basis for negotiations, and their starting position on both sides favors complete mutual understanding and trust, equality and respect, unity of views on key issues of world politics and bilateral relations."

Western experts often speak in a dismissive tone that the Central Asians prefer the Chinese because they never raise difficult issues such as democracy and human rights. But this is far too simplistic a reading. Central Asian countries see Western discourse on democracy and human rights as doublespeak from countries that pander to authoritarian regimes without scruples when it suits their business interests.

Central Asian countries draw satisfaction that eventually Washington is no more trampling on the region's sensitivities and ethos. The fashion in which Uzbekistan taught an enduring lesson to the European Union and the US regarding mutual respect and equitable relationship was widely noted in the region's capitals.

But that is only part of the story. The main thing is that China has reset the terms of the West's engagement with Central Asia. Western countries need to negotiate hard with Central Asian interlocutors squarely. Secondly, while they are under compulsion to abandon the cherry-picking approach they once took - touching the region's precious minerals and shying away from any further involvement such as in the manufacturing sector or agriculture - the ground rules of engagement that Nazarbayev spelt out at the investors' forum in Astana give a foretaste of what is to come.

China's track record in Turkmenistan displays the new standards for the west. China-Turkmenistan trade has jumped 40 times since 2000; 35 enterprises are working in Turkmenistan today with Chinese capital. Chinese companies are active in sectors of the Turkmen economy as diverse as oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, agriculture, textile, chemical and food industries, healthcare and construction.

From Ashgabat's point of view, China's interest in comprehensive engagement with the Turkmen political economy stands in contrast with the predatory instincts of the Western companies that zero in on the mineral industry with maniacal zeal. Certainly, in the process, China also ends up taking a big share of the Turkmen energy sector.

... but reassures Moscow

The second aspect to be noted is that with the commencement of China's Central Asia pipeline, Russia's post-Soviet control of gas exports from Central Asia has ended. The American commentators have tried to propagate this in terms of China's gain turning out to be Russia's loss. But it isn't quite a zero-sum game in that sense. Beijing has been unusually forthright in discussing the delicate issue of whether China is locked into competition with Russia over Central Asia's energy.

"China is pursuing diversification of energy imports, while the Central Asian countries are pursuing diversification of exports,' said Zhang Xiyuan, the Chinese foreign ministry official briefing the press on Hu's visit to Ashgabat. "This kind of cooperation will naturally continue and has room to develop."

In other words, China's cooperation with Central Asia rests on a convergence of mutual interests. Chinese commentaries have stressed that "export diversification" as a strategic option has became necessary for Central Asian countries after the financial crisis and as European countries' demand for the region's natural gas has decreased.

Pan Guang, director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies and a prominent scholar, says China's "huge foreign-exchange purchasing capacity and advantageous geographical position is extremely attractive" to the gas exporters of Central Asia. China's energy cooperation will also promote development of non-energy industries in the region such as chemical, agricultural, transport infrastructure construction and light industries, according to the Chinese analysts. Russia's security interests would also be served, as unemployment, a root of instability, will be cut, they said.

Taking all factors into account, therefore, the People's Daily newspaper concluded that the Chinese pipeline was an opportunity for Russia.

"Some people in Russia are concerned and media agencies have exaggerated the event to attract public attention, asserting that China will become Russia's major strategic competitor in the Central Asian energy industry,' the newspaper said. "In fact, it is not the case.

"Experts believe that the pipeline can transport natural gas produced both in Turkmenistan and in Russia ... [the] China-Russia pipeline mainly transports oil and natural gas produced in the eastern Siberian region. It is difficult to transport natural gas produced in both the western Siberian region and Russia's European part, so the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline will perhaps act as a 'key' to addressing the issue.

"In addition, the natural gas cooperation between China and Central Asia is open and non-exclusive, and does not seize Russia's market or compete with Russia for resources," the People's Daily said.

In essence, the Chinese argument is that while the Turkmen-Uzbek-Kazakh pipeline possibly makes inroads into Europe's energy options it won't hurt Russia's interests. The argument is well founded. With the commissioning of the Turkmen gas pipeline, there is no doubt that US and European energy diplomacy in Central Asia has been rendered a lethal body blow.

Through one mega project, Beijing has what Moscow has been striving for over a decade with a piecemeal approach. The European Union's chances of winning Turkmen supplies for its US-backed Nabucco pipeline project (connecting the Caspian with southern Europe) now seem severely diminished. Moscow can heave a sigh of relief, as the Nabucco project planned to cut Russia out of Europe's direct gas trade with the Caspian.

Therefore, if there is a zero-sum game, it is like this: China's gain is Europe's loss, which in turn can be Russia's gain since Russian gas is now certain to remain Europe's main energy source for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, Europe's continued dependence on Russian energy constitutes a vital chip for Moscow in its efforts to forge partnerships with major European countries.

Indeed, Russia can now advance its ambitious North Stream and South Stream gas pipelines to Europe without constantly having to look over its shoulder for competition from rival US-backed Trans-Caspian pipelines such as Nabucco.

Again, the US and Europe couldn't have missed the Chinese warning that Beijing intends to make a serious bid at some time for the Russian gas produced in its western Siberian region as well as its European part (which are at present the principal sources of supply for Europe). In effect, China has projected itself as a competing consumer of Russian gas.

All in all, the Chinese pipeline considerably strengthens Russia's stance. This probably explains the quiet satisfaction in Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's voice when he was asked about the implications of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline.

"The commissioning of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is not going to affect our plans to expand our own pipeline network, which could possibly also reach China,' Putin said. "I am referring to China's growing consumption of primary energy resources. We maintain regular, close contact with our Chinese colleagues on this issue. We know how fast the demand is growing there, and they too are closely monitoring the situation. The gas link to Turkmenistan will not undermine our plans."

Most important, the "loss" of Turkmen gas for Nabucco means that the project itself now critically depends on sourcing Iranian gas. In other words, Iran figures prominently in any serious European plans (strongly backed by the US) to diversify its gas imports so as to cut down dependence on Russian energy supplies.

US draws Central Asia into AfPak ...

To be sure, 2009 will be noted by historians as a landmark year for Central Asian security. For the first time in the post-Soviet period, a truly regional project has taken shape in Central Asia. It is a novel experience for a region torn asunder by numerous intra-regional tensions, irritants and misunderstandings - be it over water-sharing, Islamists, the environment or the "great game". This was underscored by the presence of the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the ceremony launching the Turkmen gas pipeline project.

It cannot be lost on the Central Asian elites that China has made such a high level of regional cooperation possible. Hu in his speech at the ceremony cited the Turkmen pipeline as a model of regional cooperation. China is reaping the benefit of some 15 years of patient, painstaking diplomacy. It will now be a Herculean task for the West to whip up Sinophobia among the Central Asians.

At the same time, China is assuming an enormous responsibility in the region as at no time previously. The gas pipeline makes China a "stakeholder" in Central Asian security. The bond now goes far beyond fighting the three forces of "terrorism, separatism and extremism", which was how China focused its phenomenally successful diplomacy in the mid-1990s.

Looking ahead, the coming year will see the US intensify efforts to counter China's influence in Central Asia. The alarm bells are ringing in Washington. At the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee special hearing on Central Asia on December 15, George Krol, the deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, said: "This administration does not consider Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to US interests. The region is at the fulcrum of key US security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts and the Obama administration [is committed] to this very approach." [Emphasis added.]

Never before has an American official stated US intentions towards post-Soviet Central Asia in such strong words. Indeed, there is an implied warning to Beijing that the US is watching its forays into the region closely and will not let them pass without challenge.

From present indications, the US attempt is to widen the gyre of its AfPak strategy so as to draw the Central Asian region into it. In empirical terms, a case already exists for including the region in the AfPak strategy. For one thing, the Northern Corridor for supply of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingents in Afghanistan and the sourcing of materials from the region for Afghan reconstruction already make the regional governments important collaborators in the war effort.

The increased presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan can only lead to a bigger role for Central Asian countries that is bound to bring them into a closer working relationship. There is also reason to believe that the Afghan war has already spilt over to Central Asia. The exact background to this remains open to interpretation but the fact is that there has been a spurt in militant activities in Central Asia (and Xinjiang).

Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol framed it diplomatically by underlining that a policy priority of the US will be "to expand cooperation with the Central Asian states to assist coalition efforts to defeat extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bring stability and prosperity to the region". This goes hand in hand with the effort to "increase the development and diversification of the region's energy resources and supply routes".

Potential threats that could come from Central Asia, apart from the possibility of "state failure" would compel the US to pay close attention to the region, Krol said. He also invoked archetypal fears about terrorists getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, which has proved a useful argument for substantiating US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"While these [Central Asian] countries voluntarily relinquished their nuclear arsenals after the fall of the Soviet Union, today the region is still engaged in activities relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, namely, uranium mining, plutonium production and the fabrication and testing of biological and chemical weapons," Krol said.

In a measure of US determination to place itself in a lead role in Central Asia, the Obama administration has announced the constitution of a new framework of annual high-level bilateral dialogue with each of the region's countries.

... as it runs out of options

US interests would have been best served if Russia and China were at loggerheads in Central Asia. But that does not seem to be the way things are happening.

Moscow looks favorably on China's investments in Central Asia, according to Stephen Blank of the US War College. "By opening the RFE [Russian Far East] to Chinese investment and blessing similar investments in Central Asia, Moscow is reversing its policies toward both the Far East and Central Asia,' Blank wrote in August. "In effect, this and other similar deals open the door to a huge expansion - with Moscow's assent - of China's strategic profile in both regions. The creation of a new regional order in the RFE and Central Asia is beginning to take shape and China is set to become the region's security manager, ensuring foremost that its portfolio investments are safe and secure."

The shift in the Kremlin's traditional policy with regard to the RFE has been necessitated largely by the downturn in the Russian economy following the global economic crisis and the sharp drop in oil revenue. Moscow was pursuing a policy aimed at developing the RFE and eastern Siberia almost exclusively through revenues from energy exports to Europe. But with the slackening energy demand in the European market and sharply reduced income from exports, the Kremlin cannot sustain the pursuit of such a dogged policy option anymore. It has been compelled to rethink.

This was evident in May when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev admitted that the development of the RFE needed to be coordinated with Beijing's regional strategy of rejuvenating northeast China's dilapidated industrial base. Unsurprisingly, the Russian policy shift also implies the jettisoning of any attempt to prevent Chinese economic penetration of Central Asia.

Secondly, Moscow faces difficulty in underwriting the security and stability of the Central Asian region on its own steam. This is despite the region's direct impact on Russia's national security interests. At the same time, Moscow has a congruence of interests with China in forestalling NATO's expansion into the Central Asia's security. The interplay of these factors encourages Moscow to regard favorably the stepping up of Chinese involvement in Central Asia.

Of course, writings appear in the Russian media occasionally about China's economic "conquest" of Central Asia, but official policy does not seem to encourage such a perspective. The new thinking in Moscow with regard to Chinese investments in RFE and Central Asia may have already begun to pay off. Medvedev claimed during a visit by Hu to Moscow in June that Russia and China had clinched deals worth $100 billion by a "special mechanism" facilitating massive Chinese investments in regional projects. It is going to be very difficult for the US to disrupt these plans. As Blank put it: "For all those who are watching for the emergence of China as a dominant economic and political player in Asia, these new deals with Russia have a profound significance that we overlook at our peril."

China has the huge advantage of financial muscle. It can simply outspend the US or European countries. Short of stoking the fires of militancy and ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, the US may have run out of options to disrupt China's emerging leadership in Central Asia. On its part, Beijing knows that the stability of Xinjiang is crucial for China's Central Asia policy - and vice versa. The two have become inextricably linked in the Chinese regional strategy.

Beijing knows that "foreign devils on the Silk Road" - militant groups with foreign backers - can harass China by blowing up long stretches of the pipelines which are impractical for Beijing to protect in Xinjiang's vast mountains and deserts. That is one solid reason why Beijing has not been taken in by the US overtures for cooperation in Afghanistan nor is enamored by Obama's standing invitation to step into South Asia as the arbiter of peace and regional security.

Beijing is extremely wary of the hidden intentions behind the Afghan strategy Obama recently unveiled. In fact, Chinese criticism of the US troop surge in Afghanistan has become quite forceful lately. Last Thursday, the People's Daily wrote:

Yes, sometimes history does recur ... The shadow of the Vietnam War even now still hovers ... what unfolds is replicating the model in Iraq, and further back, in Vietnam.

The war-torn Afghan population will not side with the slumbering Karzai government nor will they welcome the US presence. On the other hand, the bigger footprint made by the enhanced US troops and its NATO allies only help fuel the insurgency and trigger more fierce resistance ... Taliban dies hard.

The predicament facing the US and the one-year old Obama administration is that at the time, there seems no policy that can reverse the undoing in Afghanistan, even with more troops and better-placed tactics. But the young president will try whatever he can to steer clear of the pitfall that would turn the superpower into an occupying power.

China (and Russia) have reason to be on guard that Obama's Afghan surge and the new strategy as a whole essentially aim at pursuing longstanding US strategic interests of controlling Central Asia and containing Russia and China through "soft power" - methods different from those of the previous US administrations. Clearly, the Russian-Chinese cooperation in Central Asia factors in the US game plan in the Hindu Kush, which is shrouded in mystery. Having said that, China will also find it worrisome that Russia tends to speak in two voices at times about its ties with NATO within the "reset" of relations with the US.

The specter of an open-ended US military presence in the region haunts China. After all, China was the US's accomplice against the Soviet Union in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and should know that Washington has myriad ways to make use of radical and extremist elements as instruments of geopolitics. China can see right in front of its eyes the horrible example of its "all-weather friend" Pakistan, which by associating with US strategy in Afghanistan has been dragged into the vortex of instability and become the target of religious extremists and militants.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.